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Soviet Union

Military Affairs

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**Role of Political Commissars in Civil War Army
Recalled**

[Editorial report] Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 23, December 1987, carries on pages 37-42 a 2800-word article by Major V. Davydov headlined "The Party's Plenipotentiaries: Entrusted with the Fate of the Army." Davydov praises the contribution of Communist Party political commissars to the Red Army's victory in the Civil War, recalling that the "enemies of the revolution" called the commissars a

"new type of weapon." In particular, he notes the commissars' functions of insuring the loyalty of former Tsarist military officers serving in the Red Army, and in carrying out propaganda among the soldiers of the various White armies. He also notes that, among others, K. Ye. Voroshilov, S. M. Kirov, V. V. Kuybyshev, and I. V. Stalin served as political commissars. The bulk of the article is devoted to stories of heroic action by individual political commissars. COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1987.

Tactics: Importance of Timing in Introduction of Second Echelon Forces

18010047 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Nov 87 pp 1-2

[Article by Col G. Kokarev: "In an Unforeseen Situation"]

[Text] The past training year was difficult for us all. In military training, as in the other spheres of the activity of the forces, an active search took place for forms and methods of work that most took into account the increased demands of the party upon the Armed Forces and the fundamental postulates of military doctrine. And the search for that which is new, modern, and advanced, as is known, cannot avoid a struggle with that which is old and obsolete. This was the case also in the exercises in which I took part. Commanders and staffs looked on them differently. Their actions were correspondingly evaluated. Now, thinking about what has been seen at different periods of the training year, including in its concluding stage, one can understand quite clearly how much still remains to be done to ensure that the forces truly study that which is required in war.

The artillery volleys made hollow retorts as they flew to the edge of the pine forest to where tanks of the battalion commanded by Maj I. Novikov had just moved. The battle raged far ahead, on the smoke-covered horizon, where first echelon subunits were breaking through the "enemy" defense. And here was the second echelon.

Maj Novikov was no novice in tactics. He understood his role. If the attackers were successful he was to be committed to combat on the main axis. However, he did not eliminate the possible variant in which the battalion commitment might be required earlier than the planned time, to replace first echelon subunits that had lost combat effectiveness, to repulse counterattacks of superior "enemy" forces, etc. Both Novikov himself and the other battalion officers prepared for this. Fire control training exercises, and a group terrain exercise were carried out taking into account anticipated variants in the development of the tactical situation.

The battalion commander unfolded his map. The first line for commitment of the second echelon was marked in the gap between the combat formations of the attacking subunits on the main strike axis. In this variant reliable suppression of the "enemy" by artillery fire and by weapons of the first echelon subunits was guaranteed. It was necessary only to establish close coordination with them. This variant seemed most preferable to Maj Novikov.

However, it was not possible to use it. Right in the planned sector for commitment of the second echelon the opposing side suddenly moved forward an antitank reserve. The regimental commander decided to operate according to the second variant; to commit the battalion to combat from behind the left flank of the attacking

subunits. It was clear that in this situation time would decide everything. If the battalion were able to move to the indicated line before the "enemy" transferred there his antitank resources, which were already deployed in another sector, success would be ensured. If not...

In order to speed up movement the battalion commander ordered the battalion to move in company columns. At accelerated speeds the tanks quickly reached the line from which the attack into the "enemy" flank, given effective artillery fire support, promised the battalion success. But the terrain did not permit deployment. On the right of the hill to where the battalion moved flowed a stream with swampy banks, and on the left the wall of a forest.

Here ensued a most dramatic moment in the duel between the opposing sides. It was here that the "enemy" battalion waited, hoping for easy success. But it erred. Novikov anticipated such a turn of events and sent one of his companies ahead of time to envelop the hill. The route of the company was not close, since, due to terrain features it was necessary to accomplish a long range envelopment. But, the timely start of the maneuver played its role. The attack from the front and flank turned out to be unexpected by the defenders and predecided the outcome of the battle.

It is not accidental that I discussed in such detail this episode of one of the exercises I attended in the concluding stage of the training year. The fact is that frequently one can still see how some commanders, preparing for exercises, work out in detail only questions associated with the actions of the first echelon. They say that they will orient themselves during the course of the exercise. This position is no accident. It is the direct result of the practice, widespread in the recent past, when the demonstration aspect predominated in exercises. It is no secret, and we representatives of higher headquarters often evaluated the actions of subunits in a training battle according to how effective the forward edge of the "enemy" defense was attacked. They were good lads if they were able to deploy into combat formation handsomely, open fire harmoniously and burst onto the defenders' position at the indicated time. And the commitment to battle of the second echelon was seen as the contribution of a standard scheme, and nothing more. Even the fuel supply in the tanks of the vehicles and the amount of ammunition did not anticipate lengthy actions.

Here, in my view, it is appropriate to mention that the experience of the Great Patriotic War quite convincingly shows how real is the role of the second echelon. There are numerous examples indicating that a correctly determined composition, place and time of commitment of the second echelon had a decisive effect on the final result of the combat operations. The initiative and creativity of commanders, and their ability to think and act in a non-stereotyped way, was of great importance.

For example, here is but one episode of the combat history of the 74th Gds Rfl Regt, 27th Gds Rfl Div. It was January 1945. The regiment second echelon was to be committed after the breakthrough of the first Hitlerite position in the center. But, in the course of the battle it became clear that the first echelon battalions would not be able to achieve success on this axis. And, on the left flank reconnaissance detected a gap in the enemy combat structure. It was precisely there that the regiment commander decided to commit the second echelon. As a result, it was possible to make a powerful and unexpected strike into the flank of the defending Hitlerites.

Of course, boldness and readiness to take risks are required in order to reject a previously developed plan on the spot, during the course of the battle, and make a new decision. But failing to take risks, one may miss the only chance for success in a battle. Such is the harsh lesson of war.

Much has changed since the war in the nature of combat actions by the ground forces. Nevertheless, as before, the question of the place and time for commitment of the second echelon has not been removed from the agenda. As before, here the commander needs both boldness and readiness to take risks. Moreover, the importance of initiative on the part of the commander and a creative approach has today increased immeasurably, as a result of the dynamism of combat operations and the change in the capabilities of weapons and equipment. Now frequently only minutes are allowed for making decisions, even in the second echelon. Are we ready for this?

In one exercise I observed the actions of Capt M. Nazarov, who was acting battalion commander. Operating in second echelon, the battalion was late in moving out to the line of transition to the attack. But Capt Nazarov did not attach particular importance to this; they were only a few minutes late... It was necessary to explain to the officer that frequently these very minutes decide the outcome of battles.

This is a matter of fact. If commitment is premature a situation may be created in which the second echelon wedges into the combat formations of the first echelon, and naturally hampers fulfillment of the mission. Yes, and this will complicate the movement of the second echelon as well, and deprive it of the ability to maneuver. All of this entails unjustified losses and, most importantly, markedly reduces the striking power and offensive capabilities of both echelons. Lateness in commitment enables the enemy to exploit the mistake made the attackers and the reduction in the strength of the attack.

However, how can the most appropriate moment for commitment of the second echelon be determined?

There is no unambiguous answer to this. In battle many factors influence the commander's decision. It is good if the tactical situation makes it possible to implement consistently the previously outlined plan of action. Then

the question of commitment of the second echelon will not be so acute. It becomes so, as is known, when it is necessary to change the initial plan. Here it is not inappropriate to recall one popular expression: "That improvisation is more successful which is better prepared." Yes, in order not to be taken aback in an unanticipated situation on the battlefield, it is necessary to be able to anticipate.

Every commander knows perfectly well that the commitment of additional forces from the depth is implemented where and when it will create decisive superiority over the enemy. Consequently, the commander must continuously have an adequately precise impression of what forces and resources the enemy side possesses at any given moment and in any given sector, regardless of the time of day or method of combat operations. This is achieved through attentive observation of the development of the tactical situation, continuous collection of intelligence information, and detailed keeping of the map... Then, by the way, it is also easier to avoid enemy provoked commitment of the second echelon, as also happens.

Why did the above mentioned Maj Novikov win? Because, at the required moment on an unexpected axis the reserve that he allocated began active operations. Due to his ability to anticipate the nature of the "enemy" actions, the battalion commander succeeded in imposing his will upon the enemy and knocking him off of a tactically advantageous line.

Returning to this exercise, I note that thorough knowledge of tactics and an ability to anticipate the development of events and competently control his subunits also helped Maj Novikov successfully accomplish missions at other stages of the exercise. In particular, skillfully using folds in the terrain and the vegetation cover, he was able to move the battalion up to the line of commitment in secrecy. Apropos of this, he maintained a distance with respect to the first echelon that was not that which had been planned, but which took into account the unfolding situation. This is also an important detail, although other commanders neglect it. As a result we frequently see in exercises either excessive density of the attackers, which leads to an increase in losses, or, to the contrary, gaps in combat formations.

Such was the case, for example, in the battalion where Capt O. Gritsenko is chief of staff. It always attempted to move at a minimum distance behind the first echelon, in order not to be late in arriving at the indicated line. And when the signal to be committed to combat came the battalion had to be deployed into combat formation over a short distance. The restructuring led to congestion. Moreover, all of this took place almost before the eyes of the "enemy." And he did not fail to take advantage of the inadvertence. A powerful strike by artillery and combat helicopters was made against the second echelon, which had not yet entered combat.

As we see, actions in combat, including those of second echelon subunits, depend largely on such qualities of the commander as the ability to foresee the situation, react sensitively to any changes in it, make necessary calculations quickly, and use terrain features to his advantage. All these qualities, as practice shows, are developed more

quickly in officers where conditions are created in exercises that maximally approach those of combat. It is necessary to aim toward this approach as we prepare for the new training year.

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Kulikov on Nato Threat

18120030 Moscow APN MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 19, Sep 87 pp 1-2

[Article by Marshal of the Soviet Union Viktor Kulikov, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty Member States: "There Has Been and Remains a Threat to the Warsaw Treaty Member-Countries from NATO"]

[Text] The Warsaw Treaty Organisation is not only a military alliance but above all a political one. This means that it gives priority to political means in its activity in the international arena aimed at both ensuring its own security and averting the threat of war in Europe, strengthening stability in the region. The entire history of the defensive alliance of the socialist countries irrefutably proves that it threatens no one, that it does not intend to attack anyone.

At the same time, the question has been discussed for decades now of whether NATO really threatens the security of the Warsaw Treaty countries, though this actually means obvious things. A threat to the socialist countries from NATO is quite real.

I shall give a recent fact. Last June, speaking in West Berlin, and also in his radio speech last August, the U.S. President Reagan openly urged a change of the frontiers in Europe, which had taken shape after World War II, meaning thereby the frontiers of socialist states.

It must be said that those words were pronounced immediately after the allied socialist countries had stated at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in Berlin that they would never, under no circumstances, be the first to start military operation against any state of alliance, unless they became the object of armed attack themselves. They do not have territorial claims to make on any state in Europe or elsewhere. Aggressiveness in politics predetermines the aggressiveness of the military doctrines of NATO states and the North Atlantic alliance as a whole. The armed forces of the bloc are openly getting ready for operations against the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty member-states. This is evidenced by the orientation of military development, operational and combat training, by the build-up of arms of all types by NATO countries.

Take, at least, NATO's "deep-strike strategy," or "follow-on force attack," concept. That's an openly aggressive concept, as its key point is to take the enemy by surprise, that is, to be the first to strike. And NATO is preparing for that. It stands to reason that our states cannot help reckoning with this.

I deem it necessary to recall that the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty member-states is of a purely defensive character. It sets the task, for the first time in military history to avert war, both nuclear and conventional.

/12232

Chervov on SDI, ABM, NATO-WP Troop Reductions

18120035 Moscow APN MILITARY BULLETIN, No 19, Sep 87 pp 2-4

[Article by Col Gen Nikolai Chervov, Department Head, General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces: "U.S. Policy Arouses Concern"]

[Text] The USSR is concerned over the American Administration's manoeuvres around the ABM Treaty, a treaty of unlimited duration. SDI and the ABM Treaty are incompatible, and neither propaganda stunts nor legal tricks can reconcile them. As soon as testing begins in space - and the Pentagon's research and development program has come very close to starting this - the ABM Treaty will be blown off. If the treaty ceases to exist, the Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons will naturally become meaningless.

The West and the East have such economic, scientific, technological and military possibilities that neither of the sides will allow military superiority of the other. In response to SDI the USSR will find an effective and cheaper alternative, which will be implemented in a very short time. We tried to dissuade the American Administration from taking weapons to space. All our arguments have been in vain, and it continues its Star Wars policy with surprising stubbornness. I can repeat: The United States will not win tranquility by means of the Star Wars because we won't sit on our hands. The Soviet Union proceeds from the idea that in the nuclear age it is impossible to create two systems of security - a stronger system for oneself and a more vulnerable for the neighbour. Security can only be for all, and it is indivisible. In case of the Soviet Union and the United States, there can only be equal mutual security - precisely what we suggest: universal security for the whole world.

Soviet peace initiatives are neither a part of a political game nor a device designed to corner the partner, to outpace him in armaments or to score political points. They are clear and honest, whereas Washington's response is not. I want to cite several examples to illustrate my point.

The Soviet Union has opened its entire territory for inspection, without the right to refuse, in line with the convention on the elimination of chemical weapons and with a view to fulfilling the agreement on medium- and shorter-range nuclear missiles. The United States sort of bluffs.

While working for the termination of all nuclear tests, the USSR proposed to limit the yield of nuclear explosions to one kiloton and to cut the number of such explosions to 2-3 times a year.

At the talks in Geneva there is a Soviet proposal for a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons with a simultaneous ban on testing strike space weapons and the Budapest program for a 25-percent reduction of the armed forces, tactical nuclear and conventional armaments of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries. We are prepared to discuss the imbalances and asymmetries in the two blocs' armed forces and armaments and to carry out cuts in the forces of the side that has superiority.

Is there anything unacceptable in the Soviet proposals? Why don't we receive an adequate answer from the United States? Judging by everything, the United States is only ready for an "armed truce" between East and West and only in some individual areas of their military confrontation.

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Danish Professor Discusses Non-aggressive Defense

18120033z Moscow XX CENTURY AND PEACE in English No 8, Aug 87 pp 21-23

[Article by Professor Anders Boserup under the rubric "Forum in Moscow": "Road to Trust: 'Non-aggressive Defense'"]

[Text] In discussing nuclear disarmament in Europe it is important not to lose sight of its close connection with the question of conventional disarmament. The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe is not only (perhaps not even primarily) their physical presence but the role they play in the military doctrines, especially on the Western side. The tactical and intermediate-range nuclear arsenals in Europe are a source of danger and instability not because they are deployed in this continent, but because such is their purpose, their role being to lend credibility to a threat of nuclear escalation which is inherently incredible.

The Western belief that its conventional forces are so outnumbered that it must keep open the option of first use of nuclear weapons is well known. Whether this corresponds to the truth does not matter, but as long as this remains the public perception it will be easy for opponents of nuclear disarmament to block all significant disarmament measures by presenting them as a security hazard for the West.

I think one has to face the fact that true denuclearization of Europe will not come about unless both sides are convinced that their conventional forces, taken alone, provide sufficient, even amply sufficient defence.

This makes nuclear disarmament in Europe conditional on the achievement of an adequate balance of the conventional level. The obvious difficulty is, that this balance is not a question of simple numerical equality between the forces of NATO and of the WTO; it is not a

question of a formal balance but of a real balance where commanders on both sides feel sure that they have all it takes to fend off an attack, even under the most unfavourable circumstances.

This being so, it is clear that the security concerns of both sides cannot be reconciled simply by altering the relative size of the opposing armies. It can only be done by changing the character of the forces and ensuring that they are much stronger when fighting in the defensive than they are when fighting offensively. The condition for genuine balance is therefore not the equality of the forces on the two sides but two inequalities connecting the relative strength of two opponents, "a" and "b," when fighting in a defensive and in an offensive mode:

$$D(a) > O(b) \text{ and } D(b) > O(a)$$

This situation of "mutual defensive superiority" is the true condition of balance and stability at the military level. It is the basis of the idea of "non-offensive" or "non-threatening" defence and it is, I believe, the only possible basis on which one could establish lasting confidence and speak meaningfully of "common security."

In the present context let it simply be noted that in principle these inequalities can be satisfied either through a common effort to shift the emphasis in the force structures towards more defensive types, or through unilateral measures. It is clear, however, that the military requirements to be met if a condition of mutual defensive superiority is to be implemented unilaterally are much greater than in the case of joint implementation.

Today's highly mobile and heavily armoured units are strike forces. As long as they are the mainstay of the armies on both sides, there is no hope of true balance in the above sense. Not surprisingly: they are after all the direct descendants of the German panzer divisions which were specifically designed for a swift-moving offensive mode of warfare. Should it ever come to war in Europe, what we need is not rapid penetration and swift decision but forces so designed that the armies would quickly grind to a halt due to the superiority of that side which fights in the defensive.

This is not the place to discuss what forces might look like. This question has been examined at length in the Pugwash Study Group on Conventional Forces in Europe with the participation of scholars, soldiers and others from East and West.

Four factors in the present situation which give rise to particular concern are, however, worth mentioning:

- 1) The enormous amount of armour arrayed on the Eastern side which seems to reflect a doctrine of "offensive defence," designed to ensure that the theatre of operations in case of war is pushed as far to the West as

possible. Such a doctrine would be readily understandable in view of the Soviet and East European experience in World War II. Nevertheless I believe that it does not serve the true interests of the Soviet Union and of its allies because it is an absolute impediment to effective nuclear disarmament and to the establishment of a regime of common security in Europe for the reasons given above.

2) The Western reliance on nuclear escalation whose destabilizing character has already been touched upon.

3) The strike aircraft deployed in large numbers on both sides. Air forces seem to be a particularly destabilizing element because they are both vulnerable and threatening. In a severe crisis the pressures for pre-emption could become irresistible, particularly in view of the fact that both sides would have to fear preemption by the opponent.

4) Deep-strike concepts, notably "Follow-on Forces Attack" (FOFA) in the West and "Operational Manoeuvre Groups" (OMG) in the East. These are destabilizing if, as must be assumed, their capability for deep penetration threatens the defences on the other side.

In the last few years the interest in the idea of non-offensive defence has been growing rapidly in Western Europe. It has been endorsed in one form or another by the Social Democratic Parties in the Federal Republic and in Denmark, by the Labour Party in Britain and by some smaller Socialist and Centrist Parties as well.

But there is also strong opposition to the idea, mostly because it is always seen as implying a Western concession with no quid pro quo. It is then easy to claim that implementation of the idea of non-offensive (or less-offensive) defence would fatally weaken the West and expose it to military pressure. If the idea of joint East-West effort to establish a regime of mutual defensive superiority in Europe seemed a real possibility, the focus would shift radically and there would be little left of the objections.

Given the interest in several West European countries, a Soviet initiative that made the pursuit of mutual defensiveness a proclaimed goal of national policy could dramatically influence the prospects for disarmament in Europe.

There are also encouraging signs that government circles are increasingly recognizing the importance of curtailing offensive capabilities and achieving mutual defensive superiority.

First Deputy Foreign Minister of Hungary, Gyula Horn, has been speaking recently of the need to extend the concept of sufficient security to conventional weapons

adding that "this would mean reducing conventional arsenals to defensive weapons, with offensive weapons eliminated from the system of security."

On the opposite side, the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, has been speaking of "the creation of cooperative security structures in Europe" which preserve the alliances but are "so designed in terms of the armament, equipment, structure, geographical deployment and doctrine of the armed forces that each side has only the capability for defence, not, however, the capability for attack and invasion." Again, I interpret certain parts of the Budapest Address as going in the same direction. In this address the member states of the Warsaw Treaty recognized the need to base the military concepts and doctrine of the military alliances on defensive principles and proposed to work out procedures for the reduction of armed forces and armaments such that this process would lead to the lessening of the dangers of a sudden attack and would promote the consolidation of military-strategic stability on the European continent.

While recognizing the importance of such openings it is also a fact that they have been in a low key, almost like side remarks, and easy to overlook. In the West, at any rate, these signals have not been heard, and their potential significance has not been understood by the public. I believe that the idea of "mutual defensive superiority," of "jointly shifting towards more defensive force structures" or whatever else it may be called could have strong public appeal, East and West because it is so plainly the only logical approach to confidence, disarmament and true security in Europe.

In the last few years the interest in the idea of non-offensive defence has been growing rapidly in Western Europe. It has been endorsed in one form or another by the Social Democratic Parties in the Federal Republic and in Denmark, by the Labour Party in Britain and by some smaller Socialist and Centrist Parties as well.

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While recognizing the importance of such openings it is also a fact that they have been in a low key, almost like side-remarks, and easy to overlook. In the West, at any rate, these signals have not been heard, and their potential significance has not been understood by the public. I believe that the idea of "mutual defensive superiority," of "jointly shifting towards more defensive force structures" or whatever else it may be called could have strong public appeal, East and West, because it is so plainly the only logical approach to confidence, disarmament and true security in Europe.

This suggests that the time is ripe for a clear, public commitment at the very highest political level to this as a long-term goal. This would be a strong political signal of the will to unwind the arms race in Europe and leave behind the system of confrontation, threat and counter-threat on which so-called security has been based for decades, and it would encourage the examination of possible steps—unilateral and multilateral—that might bring us closer to the goal.

The time is also ripe for going beyond the general principles and set down working parties from the NATO—and Warsaw Treaty countries which could take a concrete look at the possibilities and develop specific proposals. If governments are slow in acting (and even if they are not) there is a strong case for forums of scientists such as the present one to take an initiative, drawing into the process, of course, not only scientists but also other relevant experts: soldiers, politicians, diplomats and others.

/12232

Case of Draft Evasion at Moscow Commissariat
18010036b Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in
Russian No 10, Oct 87 pp 8-9

[Article by S. Reshetnikov, special correspondent: "He Did Not Report When Notified." Passage in italics as published]

[Text] *"The defense of the socialist Motherland is the sacred duty of every citizen of the USSR." "Military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR is an honorable duty of Soviet citizens."*

These words from the constitution of the USSR became very familiar during one's school days. There are now several generations of Soviet people who do not know war. The credit for this falls to those who have performed and are performing their duty and guarding the peace of their country. Each year in the spring and in the fall there are regular call-ups to active military duty throughout the country. Yesterday's schoolboys, students and young workers, and collective farmers arrive at induction centers and are sent off to the troops. They remember this great and exciting day all of their lives—the instructions of relatives and friends to serve properly, and the motherly tears. . .

But, unfortunately, among the thousands and thousands of young people, there are those who by fair means or foul try to avoid the call-up. There are only a few, but they are there.

I saw the file on conscript I. Babak in the Moscow city military commissariat, on the desk of I. Khodyrev, deputy chief of the section.

"There," the major pointed at a rather thick folder, "he has run away from us for the third time."

I looked through the documents—notification duplicates, character references and letters to various offices. Information about the youth's parents attracted my attention: the father is a senior research worker and a candidate of sciences, and the mother worked for a long time as a senior engineer in MGU [Moscow State University]. The boy himself studies at the Moscow Medical Stomatological Institute.

"Babak's parents—Vladimir Ivanovich Babak and Emma Konstantinovna Paissova—do not have a proper educational influence on the son," reported G. Kozlov, military commissar of Moscow's Sverdlovsk Rayon, in a letter addressed to the rector of MGU, where the father works, "and they avoid contacts with the RVK [rayon military commissariat]."

But perhaps there are some important reasons for Ivan's failure to appear as required by the notices? Indeed, and, judging by everything, there are a lot of them—medical certificates are clipped together in a thick file. Is the young man really seriously ill?

"Last spring we sent Babak the first notification," said V. Kostin, section chief of the Sverdlovsk rayon military commissariat. "He was ill. After some time, we called him up again—the mother brought a certificate. And since that time, it goes like this: we send a notification, and the Babak's send us a certificate. We turned to the ispolkom of the Sverdlovsk raysoviet of the people's deputies with a request to call him to administrative account—without effect. Last autumn, when events began to repeat themselves, we wrote to the institute: you see, there they are required to ensure the appearance of a student conscript. There was an answer to the letter, but it was rather unintelligible, and there was still no Ivan. In December, the rayon military commissariat delivered a notification to him personally and warned him of his responsibility—he did not come. After this, we turned over the material on him to the rayon public prosecutor"

"And then what?"

"There they apparently got bogged down in checking all of these notifications. They have been looking into it for half a year, but there are no results."

"And what about the parents?"

"Their influence on the boy is exceptionally great, especially that of the mother, but I would call this influence wrong and improperly channeled."

After becoming familiar with the case and discussions in the military commissariat, the very fact of avoiding service, I must admit, left practically no doubt in my mind. The call-up mechanism is very straightforward and is based mainly on the conscientiousness of the future soldier and his voluntary desire to perform his duty honorably; this desire does not need any kind of notification, and it is immediately apparent. Just as its absence is apparent.

There was one other fact, which made this case particularly interesting—people participated in it who, according to their social position, were at least obliged to understand thoroughly the significance of the concepts of civic duty and patriotism. In the case of the Babaks, as it was soon found out, they used their knowledge, broad outlook and experience to guard themselves and their son against the responsibilities that are implicit in these concepts.

When I started to study the facts from the short, but by now thoroughly entangled biography of I. Babak, I rather quickly discovered a simple matter with amazing clarity—his display of an appalling irresponsibility with respect to his first civic duty did not appear all of a sudden, but it grew gradually from what was at first a small moral defect to an ever larger compromise with himself and with his conscience, and what is most regrettable is the fact that the parents indulged him all the way.

The boy was doing poorly in school—his marks varied from a “2” to a “3” Director A. Orlov, class instructor N. Lipetskaya and military instructor M. Ashmarin characterized him in this way: “Unstable. He reacts with difficulty to remarks by seniors. He does not consider the opinions of the collective.”

I add that he frequently skipped classes and, starting with the second half of the year in the 10th grade, he stopped coming to school altogether.

Here we encounter the first compromise known to us, a deal with conscience, which was made by the mother for the sake of an incorrectly perceived love for a son. Paisova made arrangements for evening school for Vanya [dim. of Ivan] in the Petushinskiy Rayon of Vladimirsksiy Oblast, not far from the village where their dacha is located—according to a fictitious certificate, he was working, ostensibly at an academic training station.

Nonetheless, let us try to approach this with understanding. The boy dropped out of school (as he explained to me, due to personal circumstances). Who knows what was behind this; perhaps any decent person in his place would behave the same way. The mother is worried—the diploma is gone, and with it their ambitious hope for a higher education. Well, they may have been somewhat cunning, but this will not happen anymore. . . No, perhaps the mother turned the well-being of the son into a rigid principle. Although it is easier to study in an evening school than in a daytime school (the moreso if you do not work), but here as well the youth who took his first steps in life with such originality did not have very much success. And what measures is the mother taking? This is the kind. As A. Dodonova, the former director of the village school, recalls: “During examinations, the mother came to the school and started arguments about examination grades that were given the son and demanded “5’s”, although his answers did not deserve this. And this was done in front of the son.”

Afterwards Ivan entered a medical school. He followed in his grandfather’s footsteps—a military physician who returned from war with four combat orders, and in the footsteps of many of his relatives who were physicians. Wonderful! A remarkable road is opened to him; all he has to do is study! And at first, Ivan studied, not too badly, although he did not have to make a great effort—for some reason he concealed the fact that he had a completed 10th grade school education and that he entered a department which accepted 8th-year students. He joined the Komsomol. But soon everything turned full circle—absences started, and there were “2’s” . . . This is what A. Fertman, head of the paramedic training department, writes about his former student: “Vanya showed himself to be capable but an extremely undisciplined student. He constantly skipped classes without an important reason, he was in debt, he falsified medical certificates and deceived his teachers. . .”

How did the parents view this? Well, always the same way:

“ . . . Babak’s parents tried to cover up all breaches of discipline.”

Lessons taught by the mother in childhood, as we see, were not in vain—now the son himself handles documents quite liberally. . .

There is probably no sense in continuing further: everything is quite clear as it is. We will say only that Ivan dropped out of school, in his words, because of “the unintelligent situation”: he was enrolled in the training department of the medical institute illegally, as it now turns out, as an “agricultural worker,” which he was not; he studied poorly in the vuz, and the parents, instead of getting concerned, brought pressure on the teachers, and any appearance of Emma Konstantinovna at the institute was attended by “untactful behavior,” according to the comments of the tactful medical doctors, which simply means there was a brawl. Need it be said that when incompletely exams [khvosty] trailed the first year student unchallenged until almost the winter session, the question of dismissal would come up in the second session. And in December 1986, Babak was forced to leave the vuz. Simultaneously, as we recall, the military commissariat transferred the material on him to the prosecuting attorney.

Just a few more words about the events of this blundering life which was unable to get onto the straight path in any way. Immediately after the aforementioned events, Emma Konstantinovna initiated an intensive campaign. Complaints against the rectorate went flying to the Minvuz [Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education], the Minzdrav [Ministry of Health], military commissariat and to the prosecuting attorney. You cannot help but recall the ancient wisdom: “Valor is praiseworthy only when it is appropriate.” However, Paisova succeeded completely—the son was reinstated at the institute and he was granted a repeated year of studies in the second year. “Although he is a good-for-nothing student, he has valid reasons,” is how the findings of the Minvuz can be summed up. The military prosecutor, finding the complaint against the RVK unsubstantiated, pointed out the conscientiousness of the conscript in its account—let him eliminate shortcomings in studies, and in the spring he will go into the army. This is the position in which I found the Babak family in June 1987 at the height of the regular call-up.

It is probably time that I relate the personal impressions I gained at our meetings. We spoke with Vladimir Ivanovich in his spacious 3-room apartment, whose appearance spoke of the nature of the occupation of its owner and which had: piles of books and unusual objects which people of his profession (Babak is a geologist by education) like to bring back from expeditions—

strangely distorted roots and outgrowths which were formed on tree trunks, as he explained, in places where there was a break in tectonic plates.

"This is some kind of a misunderstanding," said Vladimir Ivanovich, "Vanya is not being evasive; he will go to the military commissariat as soon as they bring the notification."

At that moment the doorbell rang.

"Does Ivan Babak live here? He has to appear at the RVK tomorrow."

"But he cannot tomorrow; he is at the dacha! You know what, let us change it to the 6th, so that . . ."

And the father confidently, very likely having learned before where the columns were on the form, changed the date . . .

I talked with him a long time, but the father did not shed any great light on his son's complicated biography. "I do not know," "I do not remember," and "ask the wife" were the most frequently used words. In responding to the question of whether he himself spent time with his son, he answered that very little lately, and that his son was with his mother more.

One of the great people once noted: "The best way to instill love of country in children is when the fathers have this love." I asked Vladimir Ivanovich what he thought of military service.

"Since there is such a law, of course it has to be performed."

Vladimir Ivanovich himself did not serve in the army.

The call-up has been underway for three months, and I. Babak was not in Moscow. Although Emma Konstantinovna remarked quite properly that "he did not make a written statement not to leave," but it still seemed strange why the conscript, knowing his obligation under the notification to appear at the induction center departed for a remote village that is some 100 kilometers away from home. I decided to drop in on him when I was in the vicinity.

I must say that the youth's grammatical speech and the calm tone in which he carried on a conversation left a pleasant impression on me.

"Either you have been incorrectly informed or your judgment is biased," is the way he began, "I am not avoiding the call-up."

Then why does he come to the military commissariat? Because he does not receive the notifications (This is an outright lie—there were notifications and more than once. Here one fact should be recalled. The prosecuting

attorney's office took control of Polyclinic No 157 of the Sverdlovsk RZU [not further identified], which, in violation of all rules in the course of one and a half years, issued directives on the physical checkups and the medical treatment of conscript Babak, but did not simultaneously inform the RVK. This probably explains the fact that the stream of medical excuse documents to the military commissariat dried up in the spring of 1987.). But didn't the father give his son the notification he received while I was there? It appears that he did not. Vanya does not even know the time of the call-up. But, you see, professional knowledge is needed for this, and he studied poorly everywhere. "Grades are not a criterion," was the answer.

I telephoned Emma Konstantinovna that very day. This was our first conversation. I purposely left it to the last, inasmuch as I had heard more than once how difficult it was to converse with Paisova. I had hardly succeeded in introducing myself when an irrepressible verbal stream hit me.

This monologue had everything: a desire to save face in any way possible, the excitement of a squabble and naive theatricality, and also that demagogic force which is far from "refinement" (to which it seems Vanya is very "sensitive"), and which is called cheating [brat' na arapa]. The main ingredient was lacking: a genuine concern for the son. It was with horror that I became convinced that the mother, deafened by her own eloquence, did not understand the real state of affairs, and that she did not realize that the matter could not be corrected with a new certificate or complaint, that the sickness had set in deeper, that a "tectonic break" had hit her family, and that the time had come, finally, to expose the moral outgrowths that grew here, as on tree trunks in locations where there are geologic anomalies.

Indeed, she is continuously concerned about her son, and for his sake, she left work and just looks after him, but why has she over the course of many years protected him against difficulties and, along with these, frequently also from honorable deeds? "He is surrounded on all sides!" she yelled into the phone. Indeed, the mother finds more "enemies" each year—these are the military commissariat, and the prosecutor's office, and the dean's office, and the Minzdrav which did not satisfy a complaint, and now there is the "tendentious attitude of the press." Perhaps we have to settle down and think a little and understand whether she alone is the main enemy to herself and to her son?

... On 6 July, I waited in vain for Babak at the military commissariat, where he was supposed to appear in accordance with the notification which was handed to his father in my presence. The bus with the young men heading for military service departed, but Ivan was not among them.

It was not until the next day that he arrived at the induction center. This is the way the long story ended, about which I wanted to tell you.

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13052

Voyenruk Details Serious Problems in Pre-Draft Training

18010036a Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 87 pp 22-23

[Article by Lt Col (Res) V. Lukyanov from Krasnodarskiy Kray: "I Had To Leave." Article appears under general headline: "We Discuss the Article 'Who Is To Blame. . .']

[Text] I read the comments on the article under discussion in the May issue of the journal. For some reason I still did not find an answer in them to the question: But who specifically is to blame?

I have been in the reserves since September 1985. I was a voyenruk [military instructor] during this period in a school and a hydrometeorological technical school, and I gained some idea about basic military training [nachalnaya voyennaya podgotovka]. Now I understand why it is that in the service officers of units are not fully aware of its results.

While I was still working in the school, I ran into deficiencies, and rather serious ones—a weak base and poor organization of assemblies, and AKM [assault rifle] firings were conducted on an unpractical firing range. But here at least they did not say that NVP [basic military training] was an unnecessary subject. Rather it was just the opposite. Its importance was emphasized, although there was no followup. Of course, this was bad, but it was possible to work.

I saw an entirely different picture in the technical school. Camp assemblies and AKM firings were not conducted since 1980; however, cartridges were written off. There were more than 2,000 of them that were unclaimed and unaccounted for at the time of my arrival. The program for theoretical and practical instruction was not being followed. There was complete chaos in planning school hours. Moreover, basic military training lessons frequently were combined with other lessons. The administration of the technical school considered them unnecessary, a time for student rest. As a result, the students did not want to engage in NVP.

They believed that there was nothing for the voyenruk to do, and they therefore unloaded a pile of other duties on him, including such a responsible one as chief of staff of GO [civil defense]. And so I did not get any support from the director of the technical school nor from his deputy. They perceived all demands for the conduct of the NVP

program as a personal whim of mine. Indeed, it could not have been any other way: people who did not understand military matters could not appreciate their importance.

As a result, at the beginning of April, it was suggested that either I change my attitude or I would be shown the door. Not expecting this, I left.

Why is it necessary to fight with managers for the resolution of tasks that face them? This is the question I am seeking an answer to, but which I do not find.

I see the main deficiency in the conduct of basic military training in weak organization and poor inspection. Actually, who often checks it on the spot? Persons who do not know military matters. I have in mind the directors of educational institutions, and also inspectors of departments of national education. These positions most frequently are held by women. In the military commissariats, NVP management and inspection are entrusted to one person, at times in the rank of warrant officer, with whom they have little to do. On the other hand, the warrant officer manages the voyenruks—officers in ranks up to colonel. They have a different level of knowledge.

I propose transferring NVP management and inspection entirely to military commissariat management, where there should be a special section that is involved only with this subject. It should have the opportunity to have a decisive influence on all organizations engaged in basic military training.

I will dwell especially on the selection of voyenruks. These should be people, skilled in military affairs, who are capable not only of talking in a fascinating way, but who can also demonstrate in a practical way how one or another method is executed.

And one other thing also. Of what use is NVP for students if afterwards they do not go into the service until a year later? Even the most conscientious of them loses half of his knowledge and skills during this time. Perhaps it would be better really to return to the former periods of service? So that stronger and more experienced young men would perform their military duty.

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13052

Military Procuracy Conference Discusses Anti-Alcohol Campaign

18010023b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Sep 87 p 2

[Article by Col Justice A. Varfolomeyev under rubric "In the Main Military Procuracy": "A Barrier for a Social Evil"]

[Text] A session of the collegium of the Main Military Procuracy discussed the work of military procuracies in fulfilling decrees of the CPSU Central Committee and

USSR Council of Ministers and legislation on overcoming drunkenness, alcoholism, and drug addiction.

It followed from facts cited by Col Justice L. Zaika, Maj Gen Justice V. Parfenov, and other speakers that measures being taken in the center and locally to establish a sober way of life and create an atmosphere of intolerance toward drunkenness promoted an improvement in the atmosphere of Army and Navy collectives and a strengthening of their military discipline and law and order.

Meanwhile drunkenness continues to be one of the basic reasons for law infractions. It has become more hidden and is shifting to families and dormitories. Instances of the use of alcoholic beverages in military unit locations, aboard ships, during the performance of interior and other duties, and in military enterprises also are continuing.

Serious miscalculations in the work of military commissariats for prompt identification of persons inclined to use drugs have made it possible for this evil to penetrate into some subunits.

The collegium obligated organs of the military procuracy to elevate the level of activity in the problems which were discussed.

6904

Exercise Notification: Transcaucasus MD
18010023a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Sep 87 p 1

[Article: "In the USSR Armed Forces"]

[Text] In the period from 22 through 27 September a Transcaucasus Military District troop exercise will be held on the territory of the Transcaucasus in the vicinity of Gardabani, Akstafa, Gektebe, and Sagaredzho. It is being held with the objective of improving field training and problems of control and coordination of different combat arms in the performance of operational training missions.

Units [soyedineniye and chast] of the Ground Forces and Air Forces totalling some 18,000 persons will be involved in the exercise.

In accordance with the Stockholm Conference document the USSR government has invited observers to the exercise from all states party to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

6904

Benefits Upon Entry Into Housing Construction Co-op

18010036c Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Nov 87 p 4

[Article by P. Saleyev, legal adviser, under the rubric "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Information Service": "Benefits Upon Entry Into a Housing Construction Cooperative." Passage in bold as published]

[Text] Officers S. Ponomarev, P. Abramyan and others ask whether legislation is envisaged on the entry of servicemen into housing construction projects and whether any benefits exist for them.

In accordance with Article 42 of the "Principles of Housing Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics," the order of registration of citizens desiring to join a ZhSK [Housing Construction Cooperative] and also the conditions for acceptance of citizens as members are established by USSR and union republic legislation. Servicemen, laborers and office workers of the Soviet Army and Navy who permanently reside in a given locality and who need to improve their housing situation have the right to enter a ZhSK on a universal basis. The indicated persons can enter a ZhSK if they have the authority to register in these localities in accordance with legislation in force.

In accordance with the "Statute on Benefits for Servicemen, Reservists, Retirees and Their Families," which was ratified by Decree No 193 of the USSR Council of Ministers of 17 February 1981, regular servicemen, warrant officers, petty officers and officer personnel who served abroad, in areas of the Far North, in locations comparable to areas of the Far North, and on isolated military posts that are located outside of large settlements, have the right to enter a ZhSK in cities and settlements that they select. In addition, the right of priority entry is given those servicemen who have reached the active military service age limit established by the USSR Law "On General Military Duty," or those who will attain the specified active duty age limit in not more than 3 years.

For a decision on the question of acceptance of these servicemen in a ZhSK, their registration authority and arrival at the cooperative premises are not required. In cities and settlements in which special registration rules have been established by decision of the government of the USSR, the indicated servicemen can enter a housing construction cooperative if they possess a right to register according to legislation in force. For servicemen who want to enter a ZhSK, unit commanders issue standard certificates. Servicemen who have apartments in cooperative residences, when transferred with a move to another settlement, are guaranteed living space in the new place of service equally with servicemen who have no living space.

13052

Maj Gen Marushchak On New Physical Training Manual

*18010036e Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
13 Nov 87 p 2*

[Interview with Maj Gen V. Marushchak, chairman of the Sports Committee of the USSR Ministry of Defense, by S. Nechayuk, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Timely Interview. In Order To Win In Battle"; date and place of interview not given. Passage in bold as published]

[Text] Starting 1 January 1988, a new "Manual of Physical Training in the Soviet Army and Navy (NFP-87)" will go into effect. It is a basic document which outlines the system of physical training for personnel of the Army and Navy.

S. Nechayuk, a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, met with Maj Gen V. Marushchak, chairman of the Sports Committee of the USSR Ministry of Defense, and asked him to answer several questions.

[Question] **Viktor Vladimirovich, what prompted the need for the development of a new manual?**

[Answer] Military service is difficult and crucial. Today, as never before, it entails great physical and psychic stress resulting from continuously increasing requirements that are levied on personnel in the process of combat training activity. Physical training has always been an integral part of military training and education; however, it is now properly considered one of the main constituent parts of combat training. This is why the need arose to increase its effectiveness sharply, to find new ways and means to do this and, taking this into account, to rework the manual itself.

[Question] **What lies at the basis of the new approach to the organization of the physical training system?**

[Answer] The continuous intensification of the process of the physical toughening of servicemen. It is exactly from this position that all aspects of the organization of physical training in the army and navy were reviewed and that the main directions in its improvement under modern conditions were determined. All of this relates to the content and the method of conducting classes, their planning and control, material and technical support, the style of organization of the activity of commanders, and also of physical training and sports specialist officers. Moreover, it is not laid out in chapters as previously, but by tasks. This made it possible, on the one hand, to concretize special tasks according to services of the armed forces and branches of the army and naval forces and, on the other hand, to systematize exercises from the standpoint of developing one or another physical quality or motor skill. As a result, the number of controlled exercises was reduced by 10 to 30 percent, and the effectiveness of the training process should increase. The method of conducting classes is aimed not only at the

development of basic physical qualities, but also at the formation of militarily-applicable motor skills. This is especially important today, because a substantial separation has been observed between the content of physical training and the real conditions of the operational activity of servicemen.

[Question] **Apparently the fact that purely sports exercises predominated over militarily applicable exercises in previous manuals contributed quite a lot...**

[Answer] Absolutely true. It happened, for example, that ski training, even for servicemen of motorized rifle and reconnaissance subunits, in essence, was frequently turned into ski races, and militarily applicable swimming was turned into a sport. The intensification of combat training required a sharp strengthening of the applied direction of physical toughening, especially in hand-to-hand fighting, overcoming obstacles, swimming and ski training. This could be attained through the use of exercises that are similar in content or conditions of their execution to the peculiarities of combat activity, and also by including various comprehensive exercises in the physical training program that are aimed at improving the skills of collective operations of personnel of subunits. For example, those like running for one or three miles followed by a run through an obstacle course.

Together with this, the number of complicated gymnastic exercises that require a lot of time to master has been decreased. In their place, simple exercises for practicing powers of endurance have been included. Detailed methodical recommendations for conducting lessons in heat and cold in desert and mountainous terrain have been made as well.

[Question] **Many KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers complain in their letters that, along with the manual, there exist up until now several other guidance documents on physical training and mass sports. So, at times an officer has to carry a whole library of such documents with him.**

[Answer] That is a fair comment. And we took it into account. NFP-87 reflects all of the basic questions of mass sports work in military units and in military educational institutes, including the structure, content and activity procedures at military sports events, and also the procedures for awarding sports ratings and titles and referee titles and categories.

[Question] **But won't the manual booklet get too big in the process?**

[Answer] No. We understand very well that the manual is a document which the commander should always have at hand. I will note that because of a reduction in the number of exercises being studied and examined, and also the exclusion of excessive overly-taught theoretical statistics, we were even able to reduce the size of NFP-87 somewhat by comparison with the previous manual.

In the new manual, the subject matter of physical training and organizational and methodical instructions on conducting its various forms are presented in separate chapters. The particulars on the physical training of officers, and also students and cadets of military educational institutions, are set forth in special sections of a single chapter, which for the first time also examines the physical training of servicewomen. A new chapter has been introduced devoted to the specific character of physical training in the different military services of the armed forces. A majority of the postwar NFP's did not adequately take into account the peculiarities of combat training of service personnel with different specialties.

[Question] How specifically is this differentiated approach to the subject matter of physical training of soldiers of different specialties reflected?

[Answer] Let us take hand-to-hand combat as an example. The general system (RB-1) is now designed for servicemen who do not have direct contact with the enemy. A special system (RB-2), which includes methods provided in RB-1, has been developed for servicemen in the Ground Forces and cadets in vuz's, and also supplementary thrusts, attacks and parries with an assault rifle (carbine), and defense against them, and disarming an enemy during an attack with a small shovel and knife. RB-3, which is designed for personnel of reconnaissance subunits, is intended for overcoming the enemy by destructive methods and capture, and a new supplemental whole series of special movements has been introduced. From this we get a diverse number of physical exercises in programs for training personnel of different specialties.

[Question] On the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA officers from line units and physical training and sports specialists offered quite a few proposals aimed at improving special physical toughening, so that it would more fully meet the conditions of real combat. For example, night training drills of personnel in short-distance double-time forced marches and in training facilities, and the creation of transforming obstacle courses. Have these proposals been reflected in NFP-87?

[Answer] We took them into consideration. In particular, we included instructions in the manual on conducting classes at nighttime, and specific exercises are given for training soldiers before operations in mountainous terrain.

[Question] Viktor Vladimirovich, you did not talk about obstacle courses. Was the proposal by officers about obstacle courses that are easily transformed in the process of a training session taken into account?

[Answer] NFP-87 provides for special obstacle courses for each service of the armed forces and for branches of troops. It is true that the possibility of transforming them is not discussed specially. But is it necessary to do this? In addition to everything else, it is necessary to have an

opportunity to compare the degrees of personnel training of subunits and units. And here you cannot do without uniformity and standardization of obstacle courses and norms.

[Question] It is no secret that many of the norms set forth in NFP-78 were lowered. Are they lowered in the new manual?

[Answer] As concerns a majority of the norms for outstanding and good grades, we consider them to be quite acceptable. It is another matter with the "3" norms. They actually do not meet increasing requirements. The new manual looks at many of them from the aspect of making them tougher.

[Question] And the last question. How will the new manual be implemented in the forces?

[Answer] The most immediate task now for all commanders and chiefs, especially for physical training and sports specialists officers, is the thorough study of the contents of the new manual and putting all of its physical training requirements into practice for personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy. To facilitate this process, we will soon conduct a special methodology session. A new textbook and placards on physical training have been prepared for publication and should come out next year.

The film studio of the USSR Ministry of Defense has made two training films, and two more will appear on screens later. As is known, the manual goes into effect starting on 1 January 1988. And we have been assured by the military publishers that we will be able to disseminate the manual to the forces by the end of this year.

13052

Afghan Veterans Club Formed in Lithuania
18010036f Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
5 Nov 87 p 3

[Article by V. Mikhaylov: "To Educate Patriots in Duty and Mission"]

[Text] These young men know exactly what international duty is, not through hearsay and not from television reporting and feature stories in newspapers. They were there, in Afghanistan—Lithuanians (Edmondas Endzulaytis and Eugenius Yuodvalskis), Poles (Tadeusz Shkel and Viktor Smagur), and Russians (Sergey Ivanov and Pavel Postnov). They performed their international duty with honor.

... Pavel Postnov remembers vividly that night battle near the military installation where the Soviet unit was guarding a motor pool and local authority offices. Late at night, the telephone rang out like an alarm: Afghan comrades were asking for help. The problem, all in all, was the usual one, and by that measure it was routine. A

band of dushman, active in the vicinity, started to fire on the motor pool. Several combat assault vehicles were dispatched to assist the local self-defense forces.

"It seemed that we scared off the dushman," Pavel continued the story. "And then an Afghan, who was called Kasym, approached me. I had become acquainted with Kasym a long time ago, and we became friends. At first, we talked more with gestures, and I knew a few words of his mother tongue, and he of mine. He knew the terrain very well, and he assisted our men several times. So, he came to me after the battle and asked that I take him with me in an armored vehicle. I told him: 'I cannot Kasym, forgive me, I am in a hurry.' And he keeps insisting: 'ambush, ambush. . .' And so I left without him. We reached the unit without incident. I thought to myself that he made a mistake, there is no ambush. And when it was already after midnight, not being able to replenish our combat load, we again hastened to the motor pool, and it was there that we ran into this ambush. It was then that I was wounded. Later Kasym searched for me in the hospital and found me: 'Pasha!' He embraced me and cried. . . He was a friend, the kind that is hard to find. Most of all, he would take the yellowing photograph of Lenin and would ask that I tell everything about Lenin. I was not able to do this; the wounding separated us. . . "

Probably everyone who is discharged from the army when leaving Afghanistan carries with him a notebook with the addresses of dozens of friends, young men of different nationalities, who in another life, in civilian life, are especially missed at first.

Not very long ago the Vilnius soldier-internationalists joined hands in a military patriotic club. They are trying not to speak gallant words, but to the extent of their knowledge, they are doing a job. Having been released from the army into the reserves, they do not want to be in the reserves in life.

Members of the club are particularly disturbed by the current state of the physical and military patriotic education of teenagers.

"You have to work in a different way with pre-military teenagers," Postnov tries to persuade me as if I were an opponent. "You have to prove everything by example. You will agree that soldier-internationalists who have gone through the school of real battle have a moral right to educate teenagers. It is a pity that people who are engaged in this professionally—military instructors in schools and in the PTU [professional technical school], and leaders of DOSAAF clubs do not utilize the experience of the 'afghanites' [afgantsy] enough. Isn't this why the prestige of these clubs is not very high, and that they are conducted in the old way and are cut off from many of the realities of life? Someone can say that today's youngsters now prefer the 'break', or, let us say, stamp collecting. I believe the problem lies elsewhere—their interest was not aroused. I do not at all intend to oppose

enthusiasm for these, but they have different starting possibilities. There are probably more than a dozen discotheques in Vilnius, and not one parachute training jump tower. But the stark reality is that one of these pre-military youngsters, whom I and other members are asked to address, will find himself in Afghanistan. It is too late to start learning there. . . ."

This is precisely why five members of the club, setting aside other matters, went to a military sports camp this summer as platoon commanders. This role, as they themselves admit, suits them more than the role of a "general on display" at various ceremonial functions, and when asked to take a seat in the presidium. It is just because of this that soldier-internationalists, cadets at the special school of the MVD USSR imeni Yu. Bartash-yunasa, conduct classes for a fighting section in the 50th Anniversary of the VLKSM Boarding School.

Lessons in fortitude in schools, aid to families of those killed in the performance of international duty, involvement in the work of soldier-internationalists who just returned from Afghanistan, all of this is at the center of attention of the club council.

Not long ago there was a meeting of young servicemen of the reserves at the VLKSM Central Committee which, thanks to telephone communications, became an all-union meeting. One of the problems discussed at this meeting is rather critical: Can military patriotic clubs become self-supporting? Money is needed for these summer camps and for trips throughout the country. Where do you get it? We have the addresses of several clubs that converted to full cost accounting. Members of the Obninskiy club "Gunesh," for example, are renovating kindergartens; they are filling orders of the public in their photo and artist shops, and they are getting a city beach into shape. The experiment has been completely positive, although they now have to adapt. . . But, as the members of the Vilnius club believe, it is fraught with a certain danger, because full cost accounting is a rather rigid matter which aims to supplant the task of military-patriotic education with the problem of material support. In Vilnius, keeping the main function of the club in mind, they consider that partial cost accounting is possible for the time being. The moreso because, with respect to trips, transport and organizational arrangements, the administration of the Republic Palace of Trade Unions has promised to assist.

Besides all of the rest, the club will have to resolve many problems associated with the allocation of living space and necessary benefits that are do the young men returning from Afghanistan. The fact is that they do not always meet with understanding on the part of those people who have the authority to decide these questions.

It turns out that sometimes one has to wage war, even with some bookkeepers, in order that total income tax is reduced by a half in compliance with benefits. It is sufficient to show a war participant certificate at the

Vilnius Production Association of Fine-boring Construction Machines for this. But there are places where, for some reason, this is not enough. Up until now, the following cannot avail themselves of the earned benefit: Sergey Lavrenev, metal worker in shop No 9 of the "Vilnius" furniture combine; Andrey Kirillov, shoe lasting worker in workshop No 5 of the "Batas" factory; Yan Bogdanavichyus, a worker in an electric welding equipment plant, and other young men. And it is not a question of money here. It is a matter of principle. Of respect. . .

Yes, there are many unresolved problems and many matters that the club should look into. But the main thing is that it is alive and functioning and is already having a noticeable influence in molding the rising generation.

13052

Turkmen First Secretary Speaks to Reservists Conference

18010036d Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 14 Nov 87 p 1

[Article by A. Bushev, the newspaper's Ashkhabad correspondent: "Soldiers Debate. The 1st All-Union Assembly of Young Servicemen in the Reserves Continues in Ashkhabad"]

[Text] Considering the ardent passion and the fierce clashes, at times completely contrary, it was not difficult to come to the conclusion: the participants in the discussion were not novices in the matter; they had gone through the thick and thin of misunderstanding and bureaucracy, open disregard and even censure. Nevertheless, not many on this path withdrew; to the contrary, the strife strengthened confidence and gave experience.

"We should not commit ourselves only to military sports measures," Igor Chebykin, one of the founders of the Murmansk soldier-internationalist club "Pamyat" [Remembrance], urged his audience. "Cooperation with youth cultural centers is important in our work. A

teenager who comes to our club must receive various kinds of information, and not simply to flex his muscles. We, for example, have run into a startling fact: many teenagers do not have a clear understanding of such a dreadful phenomenon as fascism. We had to do a lot of work. Archival documents, artistic and documentary films, a search for former prisoners of concentration camps, and discussions with them—we brought in all of this for educational work with young people in order to fill the blanks. . .

"And it became apparent to us that a soldier-internationalist club could not do without its own KID [not further identified]. You see, it is no secret to anyone that the Soviet Army is depicted in the West as an army of occupiers. Therefore, direct communication with teenagers from foreign countries is absolutely necessary," confided Sergey Polyakov from Kirovograd."

Proposals and ideas poured out from all sides. There was a proposal to request that KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA publish a monthly supplement devoted to military patriotic clubs. Proposals were made to open a year-round military patriotic camp, for which people would be selected to manage who were "chronically concerned about our cause," and to establish a single regulation for clubs functioning throughout the territory of the Soviet Union. There was a sharing of experience also on mutual relations with Komsomols, trade unions, military units, DOSAAF. . .


The first discussion helped to understand the main thing—the organization of an All-Union Military Patriotic Association is an incredibly difficult task, simply because it cannot be resolved in one fell swoop, and it takes painstaking and detailed work.

. . . On the first day of the assembly, S. A. Niyazov, first secretary of the Turkmenistan Communist Party Central Committee, addressed the young servicemen of the reserves.


13052

BM-21B Multiple Rocket Launcher
18010059 Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in
Russian No 6 1987 p back cover

[Text]




GENERAL VIEW OF VEHICLE
FROM THE LEFT



GENERAL VIEW OF VEHICLE
FROM THE RIGHT

1 - spare parts & accessories box; 2 - cab; 3 - base; 4 - sights; 5 - multiple round rocket launcher.




COMBAT VEHICLE BM-21B

Статью читайте на с. 32

Rocket M-210F:

1 - detonator; 2 - warhead; 3, 11, 21 - set screws; 4 - bushing; 5, 14 - spacer, gasket or washer; 6, 18 - armored seal; 7 - main tube; 8 - main charge, propellant; 9, 17 - solid fuel thrust bearing; 10 - relay, intermediary diaphragm; 12 - igniter; 13 - grid; 15 - tail, rear tube; 16 - tail, stern propellant; 19 - stabilizer block.



**Training Air Defense Units for Fire Against
Ground Targets**

18010031 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Oct 87 p 1

[Article by Maj N. Astashkin, Far East Military District, under the rubric "From the Final Inspection": "Anti-aircraft Gunners Against Tanks"]

[Text] "Now things are in order; we have dug in, and we can take a break," Senior Lieutenant V. Bankovskiy, commander of the air defense missile and artillery battery, said, observing the tired faces of his subordinates. But just how long would the break last?

The situation in the exercise summing up the results of the training year was a complex one filled with hypothetical problems. During the many days of the exercise, the battery, which was attached to a motorized rifle battalion, had sometimes had to perform at the limits of their emotional and physical strength. How well had they performed? The inspectors would make this evaluation. Whatever the evaluation, however, Senior Lieutenant Bankovskiy would long remember certain combat incidents of the recent days.

The "enemy" was attempting to attack the column from the air. Given the order "Into battle!" the battery commander glanced at his watch as usual, registering the time his subordinates would need to get ready. The battery bettered the norm for an excellent evaluation this time as well and successfully repelled the air "enemy's" attack. When Junior Sergeant O. Tyan, one of the best SAM launcher commanders, was put out of action as a hypothetical situation introduced by the inspector, however, Senior Lieutenant Bankovskiy was concerned. The anti-aircraft gunners had given a great deal of attention to the achievement of interchangeability during the summer training period. Fightingmen on each crew had mastered related specialties and performed competently in drills. Those were drills, however, and this was a situation as close as possible to actual combat. How well would they perform?

Private E. Zhakshylykov, who took the place of the junior commander, calmly began automatically tracking the "enemy" helicopter which appeared from behind a hill and brought it down with the very first round. The time spent by the commander working individually with the soldier had not been wasted. And the pessimists had said that nothing would come out of Zhakshylykov. The soldier himself had been prepared to revise his socialist commitments downward. His comrades had kept him from taking this step, however, and helped him to gain confidence in his abilities.

Here is another example. During an offensive the anti-aircraft gunners had to fire at a diving target. A low cloud cover made it difficult to detect the "enemy" aircraft at

maximum range. In addition, in the hypothetical situation introduced by the inspector, the sight on the commander's vehicle was damaged. Lieutenant O. Anisimov, platoon commander, did not lose his head. He applied his knowledge of front-line experience studied in officer training. Opening the hatch slightly, he carefully observed the air situation in the assigned sector. He soon saw the "diver" flash across breaks in the clouds. Skilfully adjusting fire with tracers, he achieved good results.

There were also shortcomings in the performance of the battery fightingmen. They included poor skills in getting their bearings on the terrain and a not quite precise understanding of the specific features of combined-arms combat or their role in it. Among other things, this affected the interaction of the anti-aircraft gunners with the motorized riflemen. They once moved up to the designated position in an uncoordinated manner. Overall, however, the subunit had demonstrated improved training in the completed stages of the exercise involving live firing.

But that was only a rehearsal, one might say. The main stage of the exercise was now beginning. How would they perform?

The field telephone rang at the battery command post.

"'Enemy' combat vehicles have broken through on the left flank," was the mission assigned to Senior Lieutenant Bankovskiy. "Provide fire support."

Senior Lieutenant Bankovskiy did not breathe for a moment. It was precisely this exercise, firing at ground targets, which had at one time been a stumbling block for the anti-aircraft gunners. This was probably primarily because, it must be said, the battery had not given proper attention to this matter.

The battery Communists raised this issue at one of the party meetings during the second half of the training year. Someone mentioned the fact that anti-aircraft guns had been successfully used for combatting fascist tanks during the Great Patriotic War. The decision named a specific deadline for correcting the situation.

Headquarters did its part in organizing additional training in this area and allocating the necessary means. At the range Majors A. Khaylo and A. Denisyuk, staff officers, helped them to resolve the problem of ground targets and use of the equipment. To be sure, the main attention was devoted to purely fire matters, so to speak. matters pertaining to interaction with the motorized riflemen and tactics were sometimes left in the background or were resolved in isolation, even though fire and maneuvering are inseparable in combat.

After assessing the situation, Senior Lieutenant Bankovskiy decided that, however awkward its position, one of the guns should be relocated to the sector threatened by tanks. The fightingmen carried out his order rapidly and without detection. After that, the officer compared his map with the terrain and outlined convenient routes for possible maneuvering of the entire battery. Moving ahead, let us say that this played a considerable role when the anti-aircraft gunners, in accordance with the hypothetical situation, had to repel an "enemy" attack from another direction in the final stage of the battle.

The anti-aircraft gunners first heard the rumbling of powerful engines. They then saw an uneven line of armored vehicles roll out of the woods onto a field, pitching and listing on the rough ground. They were swiftly approaching, but there was still no order to open fire. Senior Lieutenant Bankovskiy's nerves were taut, but the officer did not hurry. He knew that they had to operate with certainty. Otherwise, the very first premature shot would give away the location of the dug-in battery.

"Fire"!

Through the thunder of the first shots Senior Lieutenant Bankovskiy heard the reports:

"A hit...."

"The officer no longer had any doubts about the outcome of the battle....

11499

Status of Air Defense in Far East MD
Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Nov 87 p 1

[Article by Maj V. Zhevachevskiy, Central Asian Military District: "Trails Over the Training Ground"]

[Text] At the moment of attack on the installation of the air "enemy," Col Yu. Dorokhov, deputy commander of the PVO Troops of the district, was in the tower which stood next to the KP [command post]. From all appearances he was slightly annoyed by the comments of the forward air controller who was nearby. Concentrating on his instruments, the forward air controller "savored": "So, the pilots had a good run! The antiaircraft gunners won't take them now... Well done! They dived like they should..."

To a person who was not knowledgeable about such things it would seem that pilots on the whole rule over the entire training ground, and that they are invulnerable. But, you see, even before the attacking aircraft appeared from the side of the blinding sun, the clear

bursts of self-propelled antiaircraft guns (ZSU) rang out. The aircraft were met by tracer trails of fire. It was apparent: the antiaircraft gunners were not letting the targets pass.

Meanwhile, attacks from the air continued. And as if startled by someone, fantastic birds with their broad radar antenna wings whirled and whirled. All barrels of the battalion ZSU headed by Capt A. Mironov pounded away at the air "enemy."

After the first phase of the battle, control film, which was supposed to establish the results of the firing of the antiaircraft gunners with impartiality, was brought to Colonel Dorokhov. After looking it over carefully, the colonel said loudly, so that everyone would hear, including the ground control intercept officer: "Well done, gunners. You hit all of the targets!" In fact, the film showed that every burst was on target. There was no doubt: if a real battle had taken place, it would be the last for many aircraft. Although, I note, the pilots were worthy rivals.

With this accurate firing, the battalion's servicemen, commanded by Captain Mironov, successfully executed the main part of their responsibility undertaken in honor of the October anniversary.

What was the guarantee of their success? "First of all," says Captain Strelnikov, "we have to thank those who created such an accurate, reliable and easy-to-handle weapon for us. Well, also, our intense and systematic training drills to become proficient in this weapon had an effect. No matter how difficult the circumstances were at times, we did not forget for one day about combat training . . ."

Perhaps the main thing that characterizes Strelnikov is his skillful combination of theory and practice in training. And this aspect also: in training sessions, including physical training, he pays a lot of attention to cultivating in subordinates steadfastness in combat work and instant reaction to what occurs in combat. There is a particular reason for this: frequently the antiaircraft gunner has only a split second to hit an air target.

And Captain Mironov emphasized: the effectiveness and quality of training of servicemen in many ways depends on the state of the training material base. It is given close attention in the unit by the officers and staff. It is improved in a timely way.

Now, about another battalion, the surface-to-air missile battalion. In the quality of fire, it yielded somewhat to the [ZSU] battalion headed by Captain Mironov. What is the reason for this concession? Captain Fironov, the battalion's deputy commander for weapons, said with bitterness that at some point the equipment caused some trouble, and he blamed himself for this. Nonetheless, it later became clear that other ranking officials were also to blame here. Take this situation for example. Some

time ago, under the pretext of "the fight for sobriety," the unit stopped issuing alcohol, so necessary to the inspection and maintenance of materiel, to officers responsible for the condition of equipment. They are advised, for example, to use gasoline instead of alcohol to clean contacts, which is a serious violation of the rules of maintenance.

"I try to convince the GSM [POL] chief," Fironov confided, "to release the authorized alcohol to me, but he jokes, saying that 'well, you have not tied one on yet.' He jokes, because he knows that I have never had a weakness for alcohol. But it is not a joking matter for me."

Moreover, malfunctions in equipment operation occur at times because of poor spare parts supplies and because repairs have to be made from within their own resources, but specialists, including individual officers, are not adequately trained for this. It is true that additional measures have recently been taken that are directed at increasing the training of specialists. In particular, new trainers have shown up in classrooms, and there is systematic work on their utilization. But the problem cannot be solved with this alone.

After telling me about the difficulties, Captain Fironov, now with optimism and hope, said that he does not intend to stand idly by and that he will persistently strive to see that equipment is maintained as it should be, that his subordinates study it perfectly and that they always keep it combat ready. But assistance on the part of command is also very necessary to him.

13052

Evaluation of Air Combat Training Against Mass Attack

18010037a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Nov 87 p 1

[Article by Lt Col L. Khanin, Military Pilot First Class, Central Group of Forces: "Report with Commentary—Combat Test." Passage in boldface as published]

[Text] One after another the fighters taxied onto the runway in order to thrust themselves into the blue skies. Singly and in pairs the interceptors took off to execute a combat training mission.

And for the aviators it is a very crucial one today. Today's tactical air exercise is a proficiency test for each pilot and a check on the coordinating ability of each flight. Aviators are providing protective cover for important installations from a mass strike by "enemy" aircraft. The mission is being carried out by aviators of several subunits simultaneously.

The first to become airborne was the flight under the command of Capt G. Dokutovskiy. This flight—the best in the regiment—is distinguished by its superior flight

skills and superior coordination ability. It is for this reason that the pilots of this flight were entrusted to engage the enemy in air combat and to draw fighters providing air cover for "enemy" bombers delivering a strike on our installations. The "enemy" had to be engaged in a specific air quadrant, and over "foreign" territory. So, first the "enemy's" powerful antiaircraft defenses had to be overcome.

In deciding and planning the organization of air combat, Captain Dokutovskiy took those factors into account. Flying toward the "enemy's" forward edge of the battle area, the fighters descended and, flying with a missile-evasion maneuver at low altitude, they were able to penetrate the PVO zone without any losses.

Now they had to remain undetected by the "enemy" as long as possible in order to insure a surprise strike. The interceptors succeeded in doing this—they were noticed only after they had already hurled themselves into the attack. And at that time, the main strike group, headed by Maj S. Pavlushko, attacked the "enemy's" main forces from two directions. The first missile strike was conducted at long range. Then still another followed at a close range. Afterwards highly fluid maneuver air combat was initiated with the employment of all airborne weapons.

Subordinates of Maj S. Pavlushko and Capts G. Dokutovskiy and V. Gerasimov functioned in a masterly way. They outdid the "enemy" in flight proficiency, in the tactics of air combat execution and in fire accuracy. And no matter how the "enemy" tried, he was not able to evade the accurate strikes of the fighters—all air targets were intercepted.

To destroy targets with the first missiles and projectiles is a tradition of the pilots of the regiment. It arose in the years of the Great Patriotic War. Frontline colleagues doing battle with the Hitlerite invaders covered themselves with unfading glory. Seven pilots of the regiment became Heroes of the Soviet Union, and the regimental commander was awarded this high title twice for the courage and heroism he displayed.

In this exercise also, the aviators functioned in a front-line fashion, they did not give the "enemy" any chances for success, and the fighters performed all tasks with great effectiveness. A special load lay on personnel of the subunit commanded by Maj S. Pavlushko. During the exercise the aviators had to redeploy to an alternate airfield and make the intercept from there. Crew chiefs Sr Lts G. Davydov and A. Terentyev, and WO N. Kosach and their comrades readied the aircraft in the shortest time for the second sortie and ensured that aviation equipment functioned reliably.

At the request of our correspondent Col P. Chernenko, Col A. Proskurnin, acting commander of the VVS of the Central Group of Forces, comments on the aviators who took part in the tactical air exercise.

The exercise in question demonstrated increased aviator flight expertise. It also brought several problems to light. One of them is the contrast in the training of combat control officers. While Capt A. Lavrinenko and Sr Lt O. Filippov successfully handled the duties they were charged with, Sr Lts I. Stasiy and O. Akhremeyev did this with difficulty, and they were not ready for operations with such a large number of air targets.

The second problem was the plotters. As is known, one specialist first class can handle several air targets simultaneously. And there was a large number of them in the air during the exercise. It is understandable that a specialist, be he as wise as Solomon, will not be able to give out the necessary information about them.

There are other shortcomings also. In particular, jammer helicopters [vertoloety-postanovshchiki pomekh] were not employed to create the real conditions of modern air combat, and the automated air control system in the regiment was inactive. So there is a lot that we can work on creatively in the new training year.

13052

Reexamination of Misassignment of Junior Aviation Officers

18010039b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Nov 87 p 4

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col S. Levitskiy under the rubric "Reply": "Formalistic Replies for Collection"]

[Text] In 1984, in answer to the publication in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA of a letter from graduates of the Kirov Military Aviation and Technical Academy called "Assign—Reassign," the deputy chief of the personnel directorate of the air force replied to the editors that the error of personnel organs in placing the graduates of that academy (as was discussed in the letter of the young officers) had been corrected. The following year, the graduates of that academy wrote to the editors about the same thing once again: they learn one field and are then sent to serve in another.

And that after the steps taken after the newspaper feature? It cannot be! Evidently by chance, a residual phenomenon, so to speak, and the editors rounded up and sent to the personnel directorate of the air force the letters of Lts Sh. Aydynov, A. Kalinin and others. Whence a timely answer has once again arrived. The commanders of the personnel organs of the Turkestan and Central Asian military districts, the answer reported, had been strictly reprimanded for their negligent attitude toward the placement of graduates of military academies and the issue has been taken under strict surveillance.

At the same time, letters arrived from the Transcaucasus, the Far East and Central Asia, once again from the lieutenant graduates of the Kirov Military Aviation and Technical Academy: for what were we taught, for what was the people's money spent? So that we would be immediately retrained?

Such is the early history of the publication of the reply "But the Steps Haven't Been Taken..." in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on December 30 of last year, in which it was directly stated that the essential measures to instill well-defined order in the placement of academy graduates had not been taken by the appropriate officials.

Lt Gen Avn Yu. Simakhin, the commander of the air force personnel directorate, replied to the editors, and on February 20 of this year the newspaper reported to its readers that an order had been promulgated in which measures were projected to eliminate the shortcomings in the work with graduates of higher educational institutions, and those guilty of work omissions were strictly reprimanded. The air-force commander in the Central Asian Military District, Lt Gen Avn Ye. Rusanov, strictly reprimanded his deputy commander for engineering and technical services, Maj Gen Avn A. Kondratsov, on this score and reminded him of the impermissibility of formalism in work with young officers.

It would seem that the problem had finally been solved. But a new surge of letters from graduates of the Kirov Academy flooded the editors again this fall. Once again, Lts Yu. Lyubimov, S. Perezhogin, S. Kravets, and A. Cheklevtsov were assigned outside of their fields in the Central Asian Military District, as were Lts A. Badriyev and A. Poskrebyshev in the Moscow Military District. Lt V. Vasilyev wrote a letter in the name of his comrades from the Belorussian Military District... The enumeration of authors and districts could be continued. It only remains to add that analogous examples have now also been received from graduates of the Kaliningrad Military Aviation and Technical Academy, from Lt S. Tereshchuk (Urals Military District), the Kharkov Higher Military Aviation Engineering Academy, from Lt A. Chernyy (Kiev Military District) and from Lts I. Khevuk and G. Petrov (Belorussian Military District).

And Sr Lt V. Pavlyuchenko, a graduate of the Kirov Academy, reports that he is not a novice, having served combat duty in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, but in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany where he has arrived, they proposed that he, along with some other fellow graduates from the academy, service a fighter rather than a helicopter. "I greatly ask that you help us. Please do not ignore this letter. My military future, after all, is being ruined."

Bluntly speaking, that is where the annual formalistic replies of officials regarding the newspaper features have led. Commentary, as they say in such cases, is superfluous.

12821

Competition Reveals Numerous Shortcomings in Leading Regiment

*18010039a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Nov 87 pp 1-2*

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col A. Manushkin under the rubric "The Initiators of Competition": "Lessons, and not just for the Regiment"]

[Text] The leaves had fallen from the trees. The colors had diminished on the premises of the Guards Red Banner bomber aviation regiment as well. It is remembered how the banners flew from the pediments of the headquarters and the training wing: "Guards soldiers, you have given your word—keep it, you have taken on obligations—fulfill them!" and "Aviator! Win the title of outstanding unit!"

There are no such slogans today, they were taken down at the end of the summer training period. What the brilliant banners summoned them to do turns out to be unfulfilled. The regiment, which was an initiator of socialist competition in the air force, proved to be a laggard.

I tried to answer the many "why's" with the commander more than once. They were also discussed during debates at superior headquarters. Different opinions were expressed, and they did not always coincide, but they were similar in one thing: it was not one cause, but rather a whole set of them, that had led to failure, to the non-fulfillment of obligations.

I have known this regiment for a long time and have visited it more than once. It should be said for the sake of justice that there are many pilots, navigators and technicians in the unit that work intensively and give their all to their duties. They are pilots Gds Capt N. Mamayev and N. Grafov, navigators Gds Capt A. Shayakhmetov and Gds Sr Lt Yu. Peters, technicians Sr Lts Y. Metelskiy and V. Lopatin, mechanics Gds Warrant Officer I. Samborskiy and Gds Sgt Yu. Gladchenko... The best crews carry out their combat-training assignments at high quality day or night, under any weather conditions. Much innovative work is being conducted in the regiment—more than forty innovative proposals have been developed and incorporated. All of this is so. But...

Problems common to many soldiers' collectives are distinctly and starkly visible using the example of the innovative regiment. It is true that many are saying here that they were "unlucky"...

They were "unlucky" that the winter proved to be harsh. Simplest of all was the calamity suffered by the garrison as a result of the breakdown of the unit's heating system in the severe January cold, blame it on the weather. (By

the way, the consequences of the "vagaries" of winter were eliminated just the other day.) But after all, there were and are commanders that answer directly for this part of the work.

They say that they were "unlucky" that the regiment was inspected by the Chief Inspectorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, that the harsh demands made undermined the confidence of some in their abilities. Yes, the time had come for strict evaluations: exacting, objective. No allowances were made in the inspections for the fact that the regiment is an initiator in the air force. The days when an initiator sometimes got high marks with a little "stretching," closing their eyes to "individual" shortcomings, have passed.

And the unit proved to be in a difficult situation from the very first days of the winter training period. The poor intensiveness of flights due to weather conditions and various types of organizational measures in the regiment had a negative effect on the quality of personnel training. It would seem to be an objective cause. But the simulator, which could not be operated in the cold, was inactive for about half a year.

How can we fail to recall here that twice this year *Krasnaya Zvezda*, in the materials "Making Up for What Was Omitted" and "In the Second Echelon Again," has written about shortcomings and blunders in the organization of the training process in the regiment. The focus of critical reporting was namely on those shortcomings that could have (as was later confirmed) led to the failure to fulfill socialist obligations by the personnel of the regiment. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA also reported on discussions of presentations by the newspaper at the air force military council. But in discussions with the leading officer of the unit, some of them commanders, the feeling never left me that they were simply brushing the criticism aside. An inclination to work with full return on efforts and to fight for every provision of the obligations was not felt. The same shortcomings were established month after month in summing up the results of socialist competition. And proper steps to eradicate them were not taken. The inability to impart a certain direction to the organizational work and achieve a turnaround at the necessary moment is one of the reasons for failure.

Take the question of military discipline. So many official conferences and party and Komsomol meetings have been devoted to it. And the situation has not changed for the better, and breaches continue to be on the upswing. Over twenty communists were subjected to party discipline in this training year alone in the regiment. CPSU members Gds Capts A. Lomachenko, M. Shishkov and I. Bondarenko were reprimanded for the use of alcoholic beverages. Communists Gds Capts V. Kaydash and I. Astafyev and Gds Sr Lt Yu. Mironyuk were punished for poor personal discipline... There were unable to put the

fight to raise the personal responsibility of communists on a serious footing here as was done in the leading units. And this is yet another cause of the disruption.

The uplifting, the animation usually characteristic of the initiators of socialist competition, are not clearly felt in the regiment. The unit can be distinguished from others only by the two aforementioned challenging banners and by the number of various commissions that are unceasingly visiting the regiment.

The commissions are a special discussion. About seventy of them visited the garrison according to the calculations of the regimental chief of staff. And it is time once again to discuss the problems of the tutelage of initiators that were already written of in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

It is obvious that new approaches are needed today toward organizing the training process. The situation itself suggests a way out—grant more independence, more space for initiative and creativity, to the regiment. And, of course, raise exactingness for the ultimate results of combat-training activity. But like the last training year, one commission is replaced with another, sometimes duplicating each other. Questions that fall under the purview of regimental command are taken up by officers from superior headquarters. Everything went as before, along the worn rut.

True, the members of the commissions are called people rendering aid rather than inspectors today. But the essence of the matter has not changed. A separation of the regimental officers from independence and, this means, from responsibility for the state of affairs in the regiment and for the quality of training of the pilots and the engineering and technical personnel has thus occurred. The regimental commander and his deputies are frequently engaged in the collection of data and the preparation of inquiries and reports for commissions and higher levels of authority instead of the organization of the training process.

I have studied the contents of the unit headquarters journal for recording the observations of inspectors. First, the commission members made only eight entries in this training year. (This out of some seventy-odd commissions!) Evidently it was felt that there is no honor in the tutelage. Second, the nature of the observations says that they inspected basically paper—the processing of these or those documents—rather than the organization of affairs in the unit.

I cite the entry left by Col Ye. Petrenko: "I inspected the state of combat-training plans, class journals and exercise schedules as well as the reporting and execution of the requirements of superior headquarters." Here is his observation: "The plan for reinforcing military discipline is not being filled."

Well now, the concern for discipline in the regiment is commendable. And a plan to reinforce it is probably needed. Especially for the inspectors. What else does it show? Discipline is poor. But is the organizational work to reinforce military discipline not more important? It follows from the entries, however, that the inspector is troubled not by the state of it in the regiment, but rather by the absence of the appropriate notations in the document. Col Ye. Petrenko concludes his "aid" with these words: "I request that the shortcomings be eliminated by such-and-such a date with a telephone report to me." Such is the style of the work, such is the nature of the "aid" rendered to the regiment.

The entries of the majority of the other inspectors are in roughly the same spirit.

Let me elaborate. No one is refuting the importance and necessity of the work of the commissions and the inspections, the more so the aid. The discussions concerns what steps are needed on this issue, needed so that the factor of the independence of the commanders can work itself through to the fullest.

Another problem was detected. There are many first-class specialists in the regiment, according to documents, among the pilots, navigators and technicians. It would seem that it is namely they that should set an example in the combat training. And what is the true situation? During the course of tactical bombing flights, the crew where Gds Sr Lt A. Ovchinnikov is the navigator carried out a bombing run on the range that was way off target. And the navigator, after all, holds the qualification of a first-class specialist.

And there were many such instances during the course of the training year. It looks like the class qualifications of the specialists in the regiment do not always correspond to their actual level of training. The following detail is typical herein. During a recent trip to the regiment, I requested that they show me a list of the unit's best specialists. It naturally included the airmen with classifications no lower than first class. But it also struck me that among the best were the names of airmen that had received unsatisfactory evaluations in inspectional verification. It is thus consistent to ask: what are the others of lower classes like?

Gds Capt S. Volochay, a first-class military pilot, committed a gross error in landing approach. Gds Capt V. Podvalnyy, also holding first-class qualification, tried to conceal his erroneous actions. Another example. A pair of bombers carried out exercises in group coordination. In the lead was the crew headed by the experienced squadron commander Gds Lt Col S. Kravchenko. During the aerial maneuvers, the wingman lost sight of his partner. In this instance, the rules of air duty require a halt to all maneuvers by the aircraft, a report to the commander and movement to a zone of good visibility.

The pilot did not fulfill the requirements of the guidance documents, however, and began to look for his partner. And a dangerous near-miss of the aircraft occurred during a banking turn...

There is, so to speak, a hidden deception behind these instances. Weaknesses in the training of highly skilled specialists give results on paper that please and reassure. But after all, the airmen "scored points" under conditions that were not the most severe. And it turns out that a pilot or navigator has the highest qualifications according to the documents, but does not have the requisite mastery of skills. That is where the chase after favorable indicators is leading.

The lessons of the initiator regiment are not lessons for the personnel of that unit alone. They caution everyone against superficial approaches to the organization of competition and the activity of commanders, political workers and party and Komsomol organizations and the care and loss of one's own initiative.

12821

Airfield Accident Highlights Importance of Flight Controller

18010046a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Nov 87 p 1

[Unsigned Article: "Flight Operations Control"]

[Text] Aviator training always entails strict observance of flying regulations, which are precisely formulated in guidance documents. It is the duty of everyone taking part in and supporting flights to know and observe them.

The flight operational controller stands guard over the observance of flying regulations. Entrusted to him is the accomplishment of one of the crucial tasks in aviation — flight operational control — which must be continuous and effective, and based on precise fulfillment of the requirements of the appropriate regulations and instructions. The flight operational controller is given full authority to ensure that flight crews receive fruitful training and fulfill their missions in the air in a timely and safe manner.

Modern aviation technology has not only expanded the capabilities of aviators in employing it, but has also increased the complexity and volume of tasks being accomplished, and placed new demands on flight operations control. Today the control officer controls flights relying on a flight operations control group subordinate to him. At their disposal is reliable equipment, which enables them to evaluate effectively the ground and air situation, see and hear crews of aircraft and helicopters in the full range of frequencies, and control them continuously, irrespective of distances and ensure a high guarantee of flight safety.

Success in accomplishing present tasks by military pilots is impossible without precise, harmonious and professionally competent actions by officials of the flight operations control group. Daily improvement of the professional skills of this category of specialists is one of the most important tasks of unit commanders. They bear personal responsibility for the organization of flights and the training of officials to control them. Flight control officers are designated from the best prepared aviators, in first priority pilots who possess analytical minds and tenacious memories, can orient themselves readily in a rapidly changing ground and air environment, are capable of making a crucial decision independently, and are prepared instantaneously to render skilled assistance to aircraft and helicopter crews.

Lt Col B. Potapov, military pilot 1st class, a flight control officer, enjoys high authority in the Turkestan Military District. An experienced aerial warrior, who has mastered to perfection piloting equipment and has a rich arsenal of tactical techniques, he thoroughly studied the particularity of flying, and himself experienced the physical and psychological burdens that flight crews await in the air. Potapov knows that the skies do not forgive a man conceit and laxity, and cannot stand the dare-devil and half-trained individual, and that at times one must pay the highest price for errors made in the air. There are times in a dangerous situation when only one man, the flight control officer, can render timely assistance to the pilot. Therefore, Lt Col Potapov is demanding toward his own professional training, and personally trains and controls the quality of training of his assistants, the members of the flight operations control group. His word during flights is the law for everyone. No one has the right to interfere in his work. The responsible attitude the officer takes toward his duties is one of the important factors in the fulfillment of military training tasks by aviators of the unit without flying accidents.

The experience of reliable, competent flight operations control should be studied thoroughly by all aviators. But, often it happens that it does not get beyond the framework of one unit. Aloofness on the part of some commanders and supervisors from personal participation in the training and education of flight control officers and their assistants, and in inculcating in them feelings of responsibility for the status of combat readiness of their subunits, leads to a reduction in demandingness toward themselves on the part of the latter, to relying on old knowledge, and to disdain for the rules of flying. In flight operations control all of this may become the cause of a flying accident or a prerequisite for one.

In one of the VVS [Air Force] units in the Leningrad Military District a prerequisite for a flying accident occurred. The flights were taking place in the daytime, under visual weather conditions. The flight control officer, Lt Col P. Zubets, cleared the pilot to taxi to the start position by a signal from the traffic signal light. Without having assessed the situation, the flight control officer became distracted from controlling the crew and engaged

in a telephone conversation. Another crew then in the air requested permission to land. Lt Col Zubets did not answer that request. His assistant, Maj V. Kostenko, near flight zone control officer, not observing the position of the crews on the ground and in the air, without permission authorized the pilot to land. The latter attempted to land in front of the aircraft standing on the airstrip. As a result both aircraft were damaged.

Careful investigation of the incident disclosed a number of serious shortcomings in the organization of flight operations control. Training and exercises on control and management of aerial traffic in the regiment was conducted irregularly. The objective control training apparatus for analyzing the quality of flight operations control and training the operations control group was not used, and joint exercises with flight personnel according to specific flight planning tables were virtually not conducted. The regiment commander stood aloof from flight operations control and could not exert complete control over the professional training of his subordinates.

Flight operations control demands continuous, unremitting attention on the part of unit commanders, and their personal example in the organization of flights. Staffs, political organs and party organizations must assist in this in the most active way. Questions of raising the level of professional training of officials in the flight operations control group should be examined at methodological soviets and discussed at meetings of party committees and in primary party organizations.

Particular attention must be paid to officers who have begun to fulfill for the first time the duties of flight control officer. It is necessary to send them to special courses and systematically involve them in training at assemblies in the large units. Using to the maximum locally the capabilities of the training and material base, it is necessary to ensure that individuals in the flight operations control group receive high quality training, through modelling of forthcoming flights and creating a state of combat tension in exercises. During the course of training exercises with the use of comprehensive aircraft simulators and electronic flight support equipment, unit commanders and chiefs of staff are personally obligated to carry out a detailed critique of errors and typical shortcomings in the actions of personnel of the flight operations control group.

Flight operations control is a complex and crucial process. On it largely depend the status of combat readiness of units and subunits, the level of aerial straining of personnel, and the operating safety of costly aviation equipment. In each regiment it must meet the high demands of the day.

Problem of Cooperation Between PVO Air and Missile Units

18010046b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Dec 87 p 2

[Article by Capt A. Galunov, Troops of Air Defense: "When There is No Agreement"]

[Text] The crew of the command post of the air defense missile battalion commanded by Lt Col S. Brylkov prepared with particular care for the control exercise where questions of combat cohesiveness were checked. The fact was that 2 months before the misslemen received a grade of "2" at the training position. And it was necessary to check how the shortcomings that had been noted were eliminated.

According to the requirement of the inspector, the control exercise was structured taking into account maximal use of the capabilities of the training simulator. This introduced turmoil. A hasty test and tuning of the simulator began at the command post, during which it was learned that one of its units was not operating. The inspector had to spend time fixing the unit.

While the misslemen were messing around with the apparatus, I asked one of the officers how effective this equipment was in training.

"The simulator recreates almost identical situations to those which may arise in combat," answered the commander. "It makes it possible to develop and solidify necessary practical skills in the men. So it is effective, and quite so."

"Why then was the simulator in inoperable condition?"

To this the following answer was given:

"We overlooked it... But in general we prefer to train against real targets."

Of course it is truly more interesting to work against real targets. This provides the special keenness of a duel with the aerial "enemy," and encourages the soldiers to display initiative and persistence more actively. But, one also cannot get by without the simulators. Among their other merits they have the following. Very instructive situations can be created, and they help save energy resources. And, needless to say, they must be maintained in an operable condition.

At the same time, one must also not refrain from training with the use of real targets. Work with them, as is known, entails great expenditures of material resources. Even a single fighter sortie costs a great deal of money. Moreover, at times a lack of precise coordination of the actions of the aviators and misslemen has an effect. It must be confessed that it also happens, unfortunately,

that the aviators are ready for the flights, but the missilemen are not ready for their combat work. Or vice versa. Such blunders, of course, are not to the benefit of military training.

In practice it has developed that all questions of planning aviation in support of air defense missile troops are decided at the large unit level, in accordance with submitted requests.

The large unit headquarters has a plan for air support of air defense missile subunits. Indisputably, there must be order here. There must not be, as the subunit officers say, merely bureaucratic alienation from one another. Once I also heard the opinion expressed that PVO aviation does not find it interesting to work for the air defense missile troops. Its specific tasks differ. Let that be so. But the facts indicate that in leading units, where people rise above bureaucratic "advantages," and view this question from the standpoint of the interests of the combat readiness of the PVO troops, they are able to solve these problems.

Several years ago, for example, in the plans for comprehensive training of PVO aviators of this same large unit, flight routes to support the air defense missile subunits were provided for. This made it possible to train the missile crews productively against real targets. Now aviation of the large unit has shifted to the so-called request method of partnership. If an aircraft is required over a position, submit a request, compile diagrams and maps. All of this is necessary. But why, suggest the missile officers, not also use, where possible, the usual planned air flights for training the personnel? Let us say that the pilots receive an additional assignment to fly around the positions of the missilemen after fulfilling their main assignment. Thus, as the saying goes, they can kill two birds with one stone. Unfortunately, in reality mutual interests are often not taken into account.

For the sake of fairness it must be said that the missilemen themselves display initiative and seek ways and methods of enhancing the effectiveness of exercises. But, not always are they able to implement their ideas.

"One time we developed and employed in practice a method of conducting exercises against sounding balloons," tells Maj V. Burdin. "But, the appropriate higher headquarters did not support us."

Displaying initiative, Maj Burdin, with the authorization of his commander, carried out experimental exercises at the bases of several air defense subunits. The essence of the idea was technologically simple. A sounding balloon with a corner reflector is raised to a given altitude and towed by a truck or motor launch, or after it is launched it moves upward at the speed of the uplifting strength of the wind. The moving object has a small

reflective surface and, in the opinion of specialists, can be used not only for training crews, but also for solving other questions associated with the training of missilemen.

The difficulties in implementing the idea are organizational. For the commander of the air defense missile battalion, for example, they are associated with moving the idea through command channels. It is necessary to obtain a signature from the command on the request for hydrogen, and then to request a sounding balloon from the weather service. It is not easy to overcome the barriers that arise.

It is another matter when the question is decided by the unit or large unit command. This same Maj Burdin was fortunate. Initially his initiative even received support. The officer formulated a rationalizer's proposal. And afterwards... The innovation, figuratively speaking, was shelved. In the large unit headquarters the rationalizer received another area of work, as if thereby giving him to understand that there are more important matters.

But, perhaps the use of sounding balloons to train missile crews is ineffective? Maj Burdin himself is convinced that small interference transmitters can easily be mounted on them, and they can be employed for releasing corner reflectors, and used for other purposes. Does this not bring training closer to the conditions of real combat?

"The idea of using sounding balloons to train crews is interesting in and of itself," agrees Col N. Penzin, chief of air defense missile troops of the large unit. "We made recommendations to the forces, but the question is who in the subunits will engage in this?"

It is true that thus far the air defense missile battalion does not have the appropriate staffs or technical resources. But this does not mean that it is necessary to cross off the proposal. With desire and enterprise everything can be solved to the benefit of military training. Maj Burdin is ready to take on the organization of this work himself immediately. He needs only the good word of the senior commander. Overall, as the missilemen say, the problem of teaching the soldiers everything that is needed in combat must be solved comprehensively, also not excluding the simulators, about which we began our discussion.

9069

Air Defense Forces' 1988 Sociast Competition Challenge

18010064 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Dec 87 p 1

[Unsigned PVO regiment article: "Appeal of the Personnel of A Thrice Decorated Guards PVO Surface-to-Air Missile Regiment to Soldiers of the Air Defense Forces"]

[Text] Dear Comrades and fighting buddies!

The restructuring that is taking place in the country and the new political thinking in today's international life call for increased demands on the Armed Forces and the PVO Troops. Understanding this profoundly and proceeding from the defensive character of Soviet military doctrine, the soldiers of our unit see that their main task is to stand guard vigilantly over the gains of socialism, to improve their combat skills persistently and to strengthen organizational ability and discipline.

We learned serious lessons from the 28 May 1987 incident when USSR air space was violated, and we have taken specific measures to fulfill the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee in the matter of increasing combat readiness and executing combat alert duty vigilantly. Conforming our work and plans to party decisions, we challenge the personnel of the Air Defense Forces to take an active part in socialist competition for a fitting welcome to the 19th All-Union Party Conference and the 70th anniversary of the Armed Forces under the motto "Dedicated military work, exemplary service and outstanding discipline is our contribution to the task of defending the motherland." Having thoroughly analyzed the tasks assigned by the USSR minister of defense for the new training year, we assume the following socialist obligations:

—to study deeply and thoroughly Marxist-Leninist theory, materials and resolutions of the 27th Congress, subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums and jubilee documents dedicated to the 70th Anniversary of Great October. To augment the revolutionary, combat and labor traditions of our socialist state, the Armed Forces and the PVO Troops. In all military matters, to follow undeviatingly Leninist precepts, the requirements of the party program and the CPSU Central Committee concerning the strengthening of the defensive capabilities of the country and increasing the vigilance and combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces;

—to perform combat duty vigilantly, to strive for high levels of coordination of combat control organs and combat crews, and to be ready constantly for the immediate execution of combat tasks. To reduce the time for bringing the regiment to combat readiness by 5-7 percent;

—owing to the intensification of the training process, to ensure higher end results in combat and political training. We pledge to fulfill all combat training tasks with high results and live firings with "outstanding" ratings and to confirm the title of outstanding regiment. Not to permit indulgences and oversimplification in combat training, to give competition a genuinely creative character and to ensure the active participation of all personnel in it. To question in a strict way those who are hindering restructuring, working without effort and resigning themselves to defects. Each of us, participants in the competition, will set an example of diligence, discipline and communist morality;

—to persist in becoming proficient in combat equipment and weapons. To maintain them at a high level of combat readiness and to eliminate equipment breakdowns due to personnel error. By the end of the year, to have 31 master-rated personnel, 76 percent of specialists with increased levels of proficiency and 84 percent with cross-training specialties. By the end of the year, to train 50 percent of the crews and sections to a higher level of proficiency;

—to strive persistently for savings in all types of resources and material means, the development and improvement of the technical and material base, and the broad involvement of personnel in rationalization and invention work. By the end of the year, to save 7 percent of the resources of radioelectronic and electromechanical weapons and electric power. To introduce not less than 60 rationalization proposals. To collect and turn over 102 tons of scrap metal to the state;

—to demonstrate continual concern for the provision of public services and the exemplary maintenance of military posts, parks, social and cultural facilities and the development of subsidiary farms. To take an active part and gain a prize-winning place in inspection competitions for best military management and outstanding post culture. Each serviceman to work no less than 6 free days in social and cultural facilities during the year;

—to improve mass sports work, perfect physical toughening, and to develop an ability in soldiers to endure extreme physical and psychological hardship. To train 82 percent VSK-qualified [Military Sports Complex] sportsmen. To create a model sports and cultural complex;

—communist units pledge to be in the vanguard of restructuring and socialist competition, to increase their professional and political activity continually, to find new and progressive methods of resolving combat training tasks, to be an example of a high sense of responsibility, organizational ability and execution and a creative attitude toward their profession. By the end of the year, all communists will achieve only outstanding and excellent ratings in combat studies, and 90 percent will become master-rated and specialists with higher proficiency ratings;

—the Komsomol organization of the regiment will ensure the excellence of all VLKSM members and competition for a fitting welcome for the 70th anniversary of the Leninist Komsomol, to raise the activity of each Komsomol member even higher in increasing combat readiness, the unity of military collectives and strengthening discipline. Seventy-seven percent of the Komsomol members will become specialists with increased levels of proficiency. Fifteen percent of the personnel will master a combat specialty on the level of technical officers.

The assumed socialist responsibilities energize our plans. We will apply all of our power, knowledge and experience, and we will demonstrate vital creativity and initiative in order to fulfill these responsibilities in the practical work of restructuring.

13052

Achievements, Shortcomings in 1987 Military Construction Plan

*18010045 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Nov 87 p 1*

[Unsigned Article: "Underway Projects — In Service"]

[Text] The final stage of the year for workers at military construction projects and enterprises is associated with accomplishing crucial tasks of placing underway projects into operation. Only a month remains until the results of fulfilling plans and commitments are summed up, and the contribution of each construction collective to the accomplishment of special purpose tasks is determined.

In the first days of 1988, important projects, barracks, residential houses, schools, kindergartens and polyclinics must be placed in operation. It is a matter of honor for the leaders, engineering and technical workers of military construction organizations and units, political workers, military construction troops, and Soviet Army and Navy workers and employees to ensure that all planned projects are delivered on time. On this depend the quality of the training process in the units and subunits, improvement of the living conditions of military personnel and members of their families, and in the final analysis, the further increase in combat readiness of army and navy forces.

Leading military construction organizations are approaching the third year of the five-year plan with specific results in restructuring. The collectives of construction directorates in the Carpathian, Belorussian and Moscow military districts are working stably and rhythmically this year. Thus, the initiators of socialist competition, construction personnel in the Carpathian military district, turned over seven houses ahead of schedule. This means that more than 400 families of officers and warrant officers received keys to their new apartments ahead of time. Here labor productivity improved noticeably, considerable profit was gained, and the targets for saving of construction materials and fuel and energy resources were fulfilled.

By 1 October 1987, the military construction organization led by Col V. Dukhin accomplished the plan for two years of the five-year plan. Here also a residence was built ahead of schedule. On the whole, dozens of UNR [work supervisor's offices], and hundreds of brigades and construction sectors, having undertaken the commitment to fulfill the 2 year targets by the 70th anniversary of Great October, have fulfilled it with honor.

At the same time, a serious lag has been revealed in the accomplishment of the construction program in the Transcaucasus and Far Eastern military districts, and in the military construction organizations led by comrades A. Kharchenko, V. Vylgin, L. Tyurikhov, and a number of others. In some of them almost half of the planned projects for the year must be placed in operation in December. What can one say? It is an extremely difficult

task. The fact that in many military districts and fleets plans for residential construction are in danger of not being fulfilled is especially alarming. Despite the fact that, on the whole, attention toward the building of facilities of social welfare importance has increased, fulfillment of the plan for their construction is lagging behind schedule, and dozens of important projects have not been placed in operation.

What has caused this situation? There are several causes. One of them, I believe the most important, is the absence of a high state of organization and order in the work, and the irrational use of work time, mechanisms and materials. Restructuring in military construction units is coming along very slowly. Preparations for shifting to the new management conditions are clearly dragging, and obstacles that interfere with taking this course has not been eliminated. And this is true under conditions in which the experience of the collectives that are introducing the collective contract are proving that the new labor organizational form and incentive is a reliable lever in solving many problems. Without its assimilation work under the new management conditions is senseless.

Unfortunately, so far science in the economic branches has not ended up at the necessary level, and has not provided any noticeable improvement in production effectiveness. Even innovations that have been developed are not widely employed in practice, while manual labor predominates at construction projects. Finally, the process of democratization of production relations, expanding the real rights of labor collectives, and improving the activeness of the human factor is moving slowly.

It is understandable that these problems cannot be solved in a few days and weeks. As we take care to ensure 100 percent fulfillment of the targets for the introduction of fixed capital this year, we must not forget that it is namely now that the foundations are laid for successful work in the future. It is necessary to change fundamentally the entire planning system, so that henceforth construction does not drag out, and so that projects do not have to be turned over in the final, winter months. It is necessary to make maximum use of the capacities of construction industry enterprises, to ensure uninterrupted supply, and to establish two-shift work.

Today the leaders of construction organizations, political organs, and party, trade union and komsomol organizations are faced with the task of uniting the efforts of people, mobilizing and directing them to fulfill the top priority tasks, and not allowing the scattering of human and material resources. It is necessary to organize work efficiently, and avoid the all-hands emergencies and storming which have become commonplace, when the only method of accelerating tempos was to increase the number of persons working on a project, and when in the chase for a favorable figure in the account the plan was

"knocked out" at any price. Such an approach inevitably leads to low quality construction and many imperfections, and is fraught with material and moral losses.

Life shows that where commanders, political organs and party organizations have sharply changed their style of work, and increased their attention toward people and concern about improving conditions of work, living and rest, the influence of Communists on training, and the production activity of the personnel, concrete results are found. For example, the political department led by Lt Col V. Martysh was able to rouse the Communists to specific deeds to improve the organization of labor and intensify the struggle for quality at construction projects. Socialist competition among military construction brigades found tangible traits and became a real force. Concern about people and attention toward their needs and desires, in combination with much organizational

and indoctrination work, aroused enthusiasm in the labor collective and a desire to reach the highest results in their work. As a result, the military construction personnel not only quickly made up their omissions, but also significantly moved forward.

To organize the work in such a way in each collective, and at each underway project, to imbue people with a feeling of high responsibility, to fill competition with a spirit of healthy rivalry, and to encourage initiative are most important tasks for the leaders of construction projects, and party, trade union and komsomol organizations. Everything must be done to ensure that the year's underway projects are turned over precisely on time, with high quality, and with minimum costs.

9069

Letter to Editor: Disenchanted with Civil Defense Program

18120037 Moscow TWENTIETH CENTURY AND PEACE in English No 10, 1987 pp 7, 47

[Article by V. Ptitsyna: "The Games Adults Play"]

[Text] Dear Editor, I need some explanations. Your previous publications repeatedly described the terrible after-effects of a nuclear war—the destruction of the atmosphere, the general fall in temperature ("nuclear winter"), contamination of soil, foodstuffs and water, the destruction of all animals and plants, radiation disease and the death of many millions of people. I also saw the American TV film "The Day After" and the Soviet production "Letters of the Dead Man." These films as well as your publications suggest that people are beginning to realize how grave the general danger is, and they are doing their best to avert the planet's death. If nuclear war breaks out there will be no winners, and it will sweep the whole planet. This way of understanding the problem is the main reflection of the "new thinking."

However, I have seen that not everybody shares your point of view. I work at one of Moscow's institutes which studies the role of art in educating the young. And this is what I noticed.

One fine day last spring we had a drill alert to check how well prepared the management of our institute was for the start of a nuclear war.

The management reported the readiness of laboratories for evacuation. It turned out that lists of people had been made beforehand, with people divided into groups, each having his own assignment in the event of evacuation. They even indicated a town for us, where we'd all evacuate if there was a nuclear war. According to the plan, made known to all staff members of the institute, everyone of us should have 100 kilos of "scientific" luggage, including paper, scientific materials and a typewriter to continue work in "field conditions."

Since artistic problems, as they told us, would not be of primary importance, we should all change the problems of our research by switching from these artistic problems to those of patriotism and civil duty which are "necessary for our victory."

They also told us that "in the extreme conditions man alone becomes an object of ecological defence." And what about earth, water and animals?

They thoroughly explained to us what we should do right after the nuclear alarm signal. There are even several variants: if bombs dropped in Moscow's outskirts, we should all go to the Kazansky railway terminal; if they

dropped in the vicinity of the Garden Circle and the only thing that would remain out the institute's building would be its walls (because it is situated in the heart of the city), we should gather inside and wait for instructions. And if the bombs dropped right on Red Square, causing Moskva River to boil, we should not go to the institute, in fact, there are no instructions on that score.

When we asked what we should do in this particular case, we got the following answer: "Calm down. We'd assemble before the signal because we'd be informed beforehand when the nuclear explosion would occur."

I had the feeling that "the civil defence exercises" are a sort of a sinister game without any rules whatsoever. Showing an alleged concern for the population in case of war, civil defence instructors don't precisely understand their task. They talk, for example, about the institute's shelters, and tell stories and supplies food, water and electricity in these shelters, but they do not know, or do not want to know that there are no such shelters in any institute.

They evade answering or offer quite vague answers to all concrete questions concerning evacuation, housing, food supplies and transportation. All these exercises seem to me to be utter fake, thoughtless, irresponsible talk for the sake of ticking off the matter. In all its standards it has not, of course, anything to do with the "new thinking" policy.

Such exercises make you feel that war is sure to begin, that it cannot be avoided, that we should evacuate to somewhere completely defenceless and chaotic, it is as if we are talking about an archery competition, not atomic war.

Every month a serious elderly man—a civil defence instructor—comes to our institute. Taking up half of our working day he tells us about defence measures in case of a nuclear explosion, using as visual aids, booklets and illustrations yellowish and worn out with use.

He could not answer any of our questions about what to do in case of radiation, where we could find water, what we should do with it to make it drinkable and what modern methods could be used to deactivate clothes.

A year has passed since the Chernobyl disaster! Who needs these exercises, who is taking us for fools?

I'd very much like to read in your magazine comments by experts about how the "civil defence" leadership reacts to the calls for "new thinking," and how their aims and actions accord with this policy? Or is the "civil defence" system still a taboo subject for criticism?

Lt Gen Vorontsov on Winter Military Rail

Transport

*18010043b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Nov 87 p 1*

[Interview of Lt Gen Yu. Vorontsov: "On the Threshold of Winter." Passage in italics as published]

[Text] Winter is coming according to nature's plan. And each time meeting it is a severe test of efficiency, striving, and responsibility in preparation for the cold weather. Last winter showed that far from everyone withstood this test. In particular, difficulties and interruptions arose in the fulfillment of military shipments by rail, and omissions were detected in the preparation of transportation equipment for winter in many units, organizations, and establishments of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

The editors of Krasnaya Zvezda requested that Lt Gen Yu. Vorontsov, chief of the Central Directorate of Military Transport of the USSR Ministry of Defense, answer several questions about what has been undertaken to ensure uninterrupted operation of rail transport in the coming winter.

Question. How is preparation of rail transport equipment for the cold weather coming along in the army and navy?

Answer. At present preparations for winter, including [preparation] of transport equipment, are going on in the military districts and the fleets. Particular attention is being paid to the preparation of rail spur tracks. On the whole preparations are coming along well, although there are also shortcomings.

For example, in the Belorussian Military District planned maintenance work is being completed in all transport activities. The military transport service has established control over this work. All the snow-plows in district units and establishments have been repaired. The inventory of equipment to clear the routes of snow and ice has been supplemented. Onloading and offloading locations are being put in order.

I recall that interruptions in the operation of transport were noted last year in the Volga Military District. They set about immediately there to eliminate the shortcomings. Now, in the district as a whole approximately 90 percent of all spur tracks have been repaired and readied for winter. At the same time, preparations for winter in the transport activity of the military unit where Officer V. Radionov is serving have been neglected. The spur track still has not been put into operation, and although the volume of freight turnover has increased the onloading and offloading, locations have not been readied. Again, hopes are being placed on "chance."

The attitude toward the preparation of transport in the Kiev Military District is serious and businesslike. Thus, in the unit where Officer V. Nazarenko is serving, track

operations have been strengthened, and the shunting diesel locomotive in the unit has been adapted for use to clear snow by attaching removable blades to it. Bulldozers have been allocated to prevent splitting of tracks and freezing of gravel. This is a rather effective means, provided for by the freight shipment regulations, but in many places it is not being used.

Question. Just the same, apparently we cannot speak about being completely prepared for winter. What should be given particular attention in the time remaining before the onset of the cold weather?

Answer. First of all, every effort should be made to accelerate the repair of spur tracks, to heat working accommodations and personnel warming stations, take in food and medical support, and provide an equipment reserve for snow and ice removal.

Unfortunately, factory and depot repair of rolling stock have not been completed, in particular that of freight cars and locomotives. Meanwhile, the experience of work on the railroads last winter is instructive. At that time complications arose repeatedly in operational and freight work, due to hard and protracted freezes. As a result, substantial loading resources were lost.

At present railroad workers have been assigned the task of improving the organization of loading and offloading goods, in order to reduce by 10-15 percent the idle time of gondola cars and tank cars used in freight operations in the second half of 1987, compared with the same period last year. It is necessary to organize loading efforts so that up to 45 percent of their daily volume occurs in the first half of the day. An equal quantity of goods must be presented for shipment each day of the week from the beginning of the month, and especially on Saturdays, free days and holidays.

These requirements relate fully and completely to military consigners and consignees. And they apply not only to military construction personnel, who receive the main criticism, but also to all units and establishments of the armed services and branches.

Question. No one is ensured against the insidiousness of poor winter weather. What is provided for in this event?

Answer. An important aspect in the struggle with snow is the precise organization of all existing forces and resources, the disclosing of weak places in the work of transport and the taking of timely steps to ensure its uninterrupted operation. This is especially necessary due to the fact that there are always trains with personnel moving on the railroads, and freight trains with guards accompanying military goods. It is important that the personnel of the military transport service constantly know the precise location of troop and freight trains, and provide cars carrying people with fuel and water in a timely manner.

In winter increased care about the living conditions of guards is required. Officers on military lines of communication when checking guard personnel should not only pay attention to the reinforcement of equipment, availability of fuel, operability of the stoves in heated shelters and reliability of their installation on bases, but also inform the personnel about weather forecasts and about preventive measures against frostbite, and check the presence and quality of the uniforms of the guards, and the fire fighting inventory.

In difficult periods in the struggle with the elements responsible individuals are designated in all directorates and departments, and in military districts and line military transport organs, who, 24 hours a day, along with the leadership of the transport administration, must rapidly ascertain weak places and take steps to ensure the uninterrupted operation of transportation.

In conclusion, I wish to say that in the time left transportation should be prepared for winter comprehensively, for in this matter nothing is trivial. It is necessary to anticipate the most unfavorable situation, so that there will not be interruptions in the delivery of troops and military goods as scheduled.

9069

Problems in Introducing Computers into Military Construction

18010043c Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Nov 87 p 2

[Article by S. Belkin, Glavvojenstroy, USSR Ministry of Defense: "From Temporizing Positions (What is Holding Back the Introduction of Computer Equipment in Military Construction Projects)"]

[Text] Military construction personnel, like workers in all branches of the economy, are preparing for the transition to the new management conditions, which provide for greater independence, complete cost accounting, and more effective organization of production activity. It is not easy to move to the level of the new tasks. Labor productivity and quality largely depend on planning, effective analysis of production, and timely supply of construction projects with necessary materials. Under today's conditions it is senseless to create a flexible system of controlling these complex processes without the use of means of automation and computers.

USSR Ministry of Defense Glavvojenstroy [Main Military Construction Directorate] is making significant efforts to introduce personal computers into construction practice. The main goal we have posed to ourselves today is quickly to support the arriving machines with at least a minimum selection of applied programs. We are counting not only on raising the workload of the existing machines, but also, through specific, visible results,

increasing the interest that leaders and specialists in construction organizations in the military districts and the fleets have in assimilating the modern equipment as rapidly as possible.

At the present time programs have been created and are being introduced to calculate physical assets in warehouses, analyze above-norm reserves, control performance discipline, etc. In order to speed up their introduction, we have tried to make the programs as simple as possible, not requiring special operator training. And the personal computers themselves require practically no maintenance personnel, are relatively inexpensive and compact, and fit on an ordinary writing table.

This approach made it possible quickly to move the matter off of dead center and transition from individual "experiments" with powerful computing equipment, to relatively extensive practical employment of various types of machines. In a number of construction organizations, especially in the Belorussian, Kiev and Leningrad military districts, and the Pacific Fleet, the creation of elements of automated control of construction is going on rather actively. For example, in the Kiev Military District a set of programs that involve design organizations in the engineering preparation of production are being used successfully on large computers. An information system is in operation in the military districts that makes it possible to receive summaries efficiently on the status of construction efforts in the most important areas, such as residential housing and social and cultural facilities, for example.

Nevertheless, in my opinion military construction personnel have felt most graphically the gains from the use of personal computers, in particular, to calculate effectively materials in warehouses. It is enough to say that there was a time when documentation in this area was delayed for up to six or seven months, which led to very significant losses. Now all the most interesting data on a warehouse can be obtained within two or three hours. This gave economic savings over the period of a year of several tens of thousands of rubles in one organization alone.

Despite a number of complicating factors, for example the lack of uniform norms for physical assets, this work is being actively carried out in a large number of collectives. Thus, the military construction organization led by Col V. Gumennyuk required less than two months to place the program in effect. It was possible to do this owing to the enthusiasm of a group of specialists led by Maj Ye. Rozentul.

Unfortunately, such enthusiasts are not found everywhere. Clearly there are not enough of them, for example, in the construction directorate of the Transbaykal Military District, in the organization led by Col M. Gromenko. And all the capabilities and conditions exist there for widespread introduction of microcomputers. But, thus far the machines stand idle.

If one assesses the overall effect from the introduction of the automated construction control system, it is still very small. Why? There are several reasons for this; I will try to name what I consider to be the main ones. I believe that the main one is that now there is virtually no coordination of efforts in introducing microcomputers in military construction organizations, there is essentially no uniform policy in this matter, and it is being allowed to take its own course.

The technical management of capital construction in the USSR Ministry of Defense is in no way defining its own position, is not hurrying itself, and is advising others to wait, either for more reliable, or more powerful microcomputers, or simply to wait. Time passes and matters are at a standstill. In the current five-year plan only several dozen machines have been ordered and thousands are needed.

There is also too little output from the economic branch scientific organizations. Essentially, the organization headed by Maj Gen V. Udal'tsov stood aloof from this important matter. Despite the large number of methods for assimilating ASU [automated control systems] that have been developed in the capital construction departments of the USSR Ministry of Defense, up to now we do not even have a model listing of tasks recommended for introduction at various levels.

Indecisiveness and a position of temporizing are leading to a situation in which there are few specialists in the local areas who have experience in working with computers of various types, including personal computers. And it is necessary to train people for dialog with computers and to overcome psychological barriers. Already now the opportunity exists to obtain significant gains from the introduction of automated management and control over the course of construction. It is only necessary that people believe in it and acquire a taste for working in the new way.

The recent, widespread tendency toward centralization of computer capacities caused the appearance of complex and costly systems. At the same time, they often do not have the expected effects, especially at low levels of the managerial system. Moreover, the use of large machines causes a number of other complications. For example, in the construction directorates of the Pacific Fleet matters are held back due to the lack of a large facility for setting up the computers.

The most advantageous course of action is to create local, specialized networks of personal computers. They are more simple to operate, cheaper and more convenient, but are in short supply. The principle itself by which the technical management of capital construction distribute microcomputers and the information mediums for them is incomprehensible. A clear preference is given to design organizations, and the construction organizations are given crumbs. There is no question that design is important, but the construction projects are

also awaiting the new equipment. And thus far, due to a lack of flexible magnetic disks, we have to halt temporarily the work of already existing microcomputers. It would seem that here the thinking should be: Give everything that is needed to the consumers in proportion to the number of machines. However, our requests of this sort to technical management lead to nothing.

In conclusion, I would like to express the hope just the same that microcomputers will take their rightful place at military construction projects.

9069

Results of New Economic Experiments in Naval Enterprises

18010043a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Nov 87 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank G. Yakushev, chief of the Navy Department of Investment Funds and Production Planning: "After the Experiment"]

[Text] Naval industrial enterprises at present are experiencing a period the importance of which is difficult to overestimate. In January of this year they shifted to new management conditions. Their authority has expanded, and a number of indices, especially gross indices, are not approved from above. The activity of enterprises is being evaluated based mainly on how they produce, not only in terms of quantity, but also product mix, quality and time periods. Such criteria as improving labor productivity, reducing production expenses, fulfilling targets for development of science and technology, and placing in operation of new production capacities are in effect.

Stable norms are being used to form wage, material incentive, social and cultural, and residential construction funds. The system of material responsibility of collectives for the results of their labor and the rational use of material resources has become more efficient. For example, now from the profit of an enterprise a sum in the amount of three percent of their value is calculated for above-standard physical assets and uninstalled equipment. For each percent that the product sales plan is not fulfilled, taking into account delivery commitments, the material incentive fund is reduced by 3 percent. When commitments are completely fulfilled it is increased by 15 percent.

At the same time, enterprise collectives have obtained the authority to dispose of a substantial part of profit at their own discretion, and to choose the forms and methods of management and the directions of reconstruction and modernization of production.

The transition to the new conditions was prepared in advance. For two years an experiment took place in the enterprises led by Captains 1st Rank A. Ushakov and V. Plotnikov. Restructuring of the activity of all Navy enterprises was based on their experience.

Now it can already be said with confidence that the new management conditions substantially stimulate the constant search for new forms and methods of work and the seeking out of internal reserves, which helps to improve production efficiency. Thus, for the first six months of this year all navy enterprises were able to deal with the plan for the sale of products, taking into account delivery commitments.

However, these results do not give any basis for complacency; restructuring of the economic mechanism is still going slowly. There are several reasons for this. First, not all enterprises have paid attention to improving internal cost accounting. In a number of cases the economic indices and norms allotted for an enterprise turned out to be far from the work criteria of the sectors and brigades. This means that the efforts of the members of the collective, from worker to enterprise manager, turned out to be disconnected. And where the weight of responsibility and strength of authority are not distributed among all subdivisions and specific executives, economic levers and incentives do not work and no tangible intensification of production occurs.

What are the reasons that the extension of brigade forms of labor organization based on principles of cost accounting is being held back? Many explain this as due to the lack of preparedness of the enterprise management apparatuses and engineer-technical workers for this transition, and the lack of a clear methodological and normative basis for the introduction of brigade cost accounting.

I cannot agree with this. After all, internal cost accounting provides for the establishment of material responsibility for the results of work not only of the labor collective, but also of the administration, as well as of the services responsible for planning and material-technical support. In many places people are not ready to have the matter posed in this way.

The enterprise where Lt Col V. Semenov is manager has already been working long and successfully on the introduction of brigade cost accounting. Norms have been developed and the brigades are calculating the expenditure of materials, components, spare parts and tools. The collective is taking an active part in production management through the brigade soviets.

"Precise determination of the end result of labor in the brigade," states V. Semenov, "made it possible to strengthen labor, planning and technological discipline substantially, and provide high quality work and economical use of labor and material resources. The brigade contract has also forced the managerial apparatus and engineer-technical personnel to work more effectively. We have long overcome phenomena such as absenteeism and drunkenness, which disorganize production.

In the past five year plan the growth of labor productivity in the enterprise was more than 35 percent, all plan targets were successfully fulfilled, and the material base developed and was improved. The collective repeatedly took prizes in competition. I. Ilin, V. Bobeyko, A. Begutov, Ye. Savva, and V. Tsibulko, the initiators and organizers of cost accounting in the brigades, earned state awards.

Other forms of internal cost accounting are also beginning to spread. Recently I visited a Northern Fleet ship repair enterprise. Here one of the main shops, led by V. Luchkov, has been shifted to cost accounting. This enabled the collective quickly to assimilate a large volume of new equipment maintenance, raise the coefficient of use of equipment and achieve substantial savings.

The example of this shop shows how collective responsibility of people for the results of their labor is increasing. The new approach encourages getting rid of excess production funds, and increasing the coefficient of use of equipment, especially of such equipment as numerically controlled machine tools, and robotics complexes. The workers themselves are making proposals to take out of production technological equipment that does not correspond to the contemporary level. Capt 1st Rank V. Donchenko, deputy chief of the enterprise for political affairs, states: "From the moment of the transition to cost accounting the shop has been handing over all work only on time and with a high level of quality. The production cost price has declined markedly and the expenditure of materials is being curbed. The production capabilities of the shop increased by one-third in a very short period of time, without any special capital expenditures. This enables us to maintain the ships more effectively. Previously they waited their turn for a long time."

Unfortunately, such examples in the work of ship repair personnel are still few in number. cost accounting has still not permeated all production relations from top to bottom. And in places where gaps have developed in cost accounting relationships, a formalistic approach to the new conditions of work gives nothing. Yes, and how can one count on success when the workers and engineers do not feel personal interest in improving production, introducing scientific and technological achievements and saving material resources? For example, in one of the enterprises, where Soviet Army employee K. Kuznetsov is in charge of material-technical support, in the last semi-annual period tens of thousands of rubles have been deducted from profits for above-norm supplies. When one speaks about incorrect planning of resources here, one cannot help but see that this is first of all the result of "gaps" in internal cost accounting. Analysis showed that no method was found to interest people in zealous management.

The new forms of labor organization and incentives cannot be imagined without the development of self-management in the labor collectives, and other forms of

democratization in production relationships. Recently, in the enterprise managed by Capt 1st Rank V. Plotnikov, elections were held for brigadier of the comprehensive brigade in the foundry section. The workers advanced four candidates, and furnace tender A. Gurko was elected. He has worked in the shop approximately 10 years, and his knowledge, high demandingness and attention to other people have earned him great authority among his comrades at work. And most importantly, the collective's decision increased its own responsibility for the work at the enterprise.

In short, so far only the first, but sure, steps in restructuring are being taken. Every day there are more and more such transitions among the ship repair personnel, and this today is the guarantee of their successful work.

9069

Reprise on Delays of Military Air Transport Flights

18010043d Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Nov 87 p 3

[Article by Col A. Dudin, honored military pilot of the USSR, and Col A. Andryushkov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Again About the Barriers, or What is Interfering With the Efficient Organization of Flights." Passages in italics as published]

[Text] *On 8 June of last year KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published an article, "Barriers," which concerned the difficulties that the crews of military transport aircraft confront on long flights due to lack of interdepartmental coordination. At that time the crew of an An-26 aircraft required nine days to fly from Moscow to Kamchatka.*

On 27 August 1986, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reported that the problem raised in the paper had been examined at a session of a special commission, chaired by Marshal of Aviation A. Yefimov, VVS commander-in-chief, with the participation of responsible representatives of the ministries and departments using USSR air space. At that time specific measures were worked out and set forth in an appropriate document signed by the VVS commander-in-chief to eliminate the shortcomings noted and prevent delays in flights due to lack of interdepartmental coordination. It was reported that a special section had been included in the guidance documents, "Particularities of Supporting Flights," to improve the organization of flights, and that new documents defining the procedure for the use of airfields were also being prepared.

After this reaction to the article it seemed as though the problem was solved. However, the editors continued to receive letters in which pilots of all aviation branches and various departments continued to talk about their "travels in torment" while conducting flights. Therefore, a year and a half later it was decided to again take the previous route in order to see how the directives are

actually being fulfilled, what is being undertaken locally to bring order in the flights, and how objective are the complaints of aviators working away from their airfields.

Difficulties arose from the very outset of the execution of this project. Officials from various departments using USSR air space rejected the proposal to repeat the experiment or proposed that such a flight be made with landing at "their own" airfields. Again narrow bureaucratic interests came to the forefront and the main fact was forgotten — that all airfields in our country are state airfields, and that the approach of senior aviation chiefs of a given airfield network to the organization and support of flights at an airfield also must be the same — a national approach.

Only the VMF [Naval] aviation command responded without wavering. Naval aviators most feel the consequences of the lack of interdepartmental coordination. They do not have any of "their own" airfields on all the territory from Moscow to the eastern borders of the country.

A simple time calculation showed that three days were required for a transit flight conforming to the requirements of the guidance documents.

"But just in case take a sack of dried crusts," Lt Gen Avn V. Budayev, chief of staff of naval aviation, who knew the situation well, advised us jokingly.

On this occasion the commander of the An-26 aircraft was Capt A. Opalev, military pilot first class. He was authorized to fly under minimal weather conditions, day and night, and had passed the good school for professional training in conditions of the Extreme North. The other members of the crew were the equal of its commander: Sr Lt A. Sokolov, assistant commander; Capt V. Lipatov, navigator; Lt A. Varenov, on-board engineer; Warrant Officer V. Polyanskiy, on-board radio operator; and Warrant Officer V. Alekseyev, on-board mechanic. All six are communists.

Capt Opalev submitted his request for the flight on time, but takeoff was delayed. Sr Warrant Officer V. Myachikov, airfield dispatcher, requested in vain a go ahead for the takeoff from his chain of command. The Ural Military District refused. The reason was a lack of available facilities. We had repeatedly encountered similar things already, and therefore, it was necessary immediately to bring clarity [yasnost] to the actions of the officials. The appropriate document stated unambiguously: "Only meteorological conditions can be a reason for not accepting aircraft." The meteorological conditions throughout the entire route corresponded to the level of training of the crew.

The dispatcher spent more than an hour "dislodging" permission for the crew to take off. The first interruption in the flight plan appeared.

After landing in Sverdlovsk we witnessed the following conversation between the dispatcher and an officer of the Unified Air Traffic Control System (YeS UVD):

“Who is on board Opalev’s aircraft?”

“Col Dudin,” answered the dispatcher.

“Aaaa, Central Inspection...”

It became clear that we had been placed under “special control.” Lively activity began around the An-26. The refueling pumps operated and the engine starting apparatus rumbled at low speed. Maj Rozhok, commander of an An-12, watched this idyllic picture sadly. He have not been able to take off for five days, having receiving a refusal to be accepted from the Siberian Military District. The reason given: no parking space and no fuel.

In less than an hour Capt Opalev received permission to take off.

“Now they will carry us in their arms to Kamchatka,” commented Capt Lipatov, the navigator, on such efficiency. “This is turning into a show flight.”

Alas, it did not turn into a show flight. Either the shift personnel did not transmit to each other the details about the composition of our crew, or, having conducted us beyond the Urals, they breathed easier, thinking, let others worry, and in the Siberian expanses we again saw reality without show.

The military commandant’s office at Kemerovo Airport efficiently refueled the An-26, but Capt S. Chernenko immediately warned that he was unable to provide the crew with either transport or quarters. We could not fly farther; takeoff time had ended. Having promised the duty man that we would free the room in the morning, we stayed at the airport hotel.

Here we had our next meeting with transient flight crews. Maj V. Vasyalin, commander of an Il-76 liner, expressed indignation that for two days his aircraft had stood idle at Kemerovo with a load of grapes on board. Military personnel and their families on Kamchatka waited impatiently for the gifts from sunny Uzbekistan, but this did not trouble the comrades from the Transbaykal Military District, who refused to accept Maj Vasyalin, due to a lack of fuel. Apparently, the instructions of the VVS commander-in-chief to have a reserve supply of fuel for refueling at airfields were not meant for them.

“If I stay here a couple more days,” stated Vasyalin, “I will deliver not grapes, but wine vinegar to Kamchatka.”

A reference is from the Main Trade Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense. “The VVS command devotes great attention to supporting our requests for shipment of fruits and vegetables to areas of the Extreme North, Far East and Kamchatka. However, instances of aircraft

standing idle at offloading airfields and intermediate landings continue to occur. The Siberian, Transbaykal and Far Eastern military districts have refused to receive aircraft with fruit. The reason is an old one — no fuel, no parking space. Aircraft stand idle for up to 10 days after offloading at their destination. They are not refueled. And in this time fruits and vegetables in the southern areas of the country, which are ready for shipment, perish.”

Fuel, fuel! We will continue to speak repeatedly about this problem. We met Maj Vasyalin again on Kamchatka, at a Air Defense aviation airfield, where his crew and several other Il-76 crews were awaiting fuel for the second week. These aircraft belong to the VVS. At the same time, the crew of Capt Odintsov (he is from Air Defense aviation) was refueled immediately after landing and continued to accomplish its mission.

This problem should be considered: Why do the majority of transport aviation units suffer from a shortage of fuel by the end of the year? We see the main cause as inefficient use by commanders and chiefs of aircraft and helicopters. Their annual flying time for air shipments exceeds by twice or more that established.

Try to exceed the limits on truck hauls in an OBATO [A Detached Airfield Technical Support Battalion]. Not a kilometer more! But who ever answered for excessive aircraft and helicopter flying time? The annual instructions on flight limitations are, to put it mildly, evaded in every possible way. The main rules for planning air shipments, to use aircraft and helicopters only when there is no possibility of using other types of transport, are not being observed. Yes, there are urgent goods and there is a need for urgent transport of personnel. But are they all urgent?

No one has yet calculated the economic losses from narrow bureaucratic interests in the organization and support of flights, and from the lack of a desire to approach this matter from the standpoint of national interest.

In the morning Capt Opalev set out for the landing field where Officer N. Kapitonov (PVO Aviation) was in charge. Here they did not expect us, although Warrant Officer Polyanskiy, the on-board radio operator, had requested from the air that the aircraft be topped off with fuel and that the crew be fed.

“Our dinnertime is over,” Warrant Officer V. Mamnov, the dispatcher, told us after landing, “and there will be no one to feed you. Our support battalion has part of what you requested.”

The words of the dispatcher did not make us happy. For two days the crew had still not once had hot food. We drank tea that Warrant Officer Alekseyev boiled in-flight, and ate the crusts that we had taken from home. (Gen Budeyev’s mention of this turned out to be apt, as we see.) The question may be asked: Why did the crew

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not use the on-board rations? It has been stated in documents for more than 20 years that a crew has the right to open on-board rations no sooner than 4-5 hours after eating, and if the length of the flight is no less than four hours. But it was also necessary to land after three or three and a half hours of flying. Is it not time for responsible comrades from the rear services organs to examine this question, taking into account the development of aviation equipment and the increasingly intense burdens on flying crews. After all, hot food is obtained today a maximum of three times a week on long flights.

We will cite the opinion of competent individuals on how this is reflected in the health of the pilots.

The level of stomach and intestinal pathology in the overall diseases of flight personnel is rather high, "believe specialists from the Central Military Scientific Research Aviation Hospital and the Central Medical Flight Commission. *"Poor organization of the working regime of aviators, and poor living facilities during lengthy trips bring them on. Today, fulfilling measures to provide crews with hot and good-quality food, and conditions for resting at intermediate airfields, is a first-priority task.*

"We do not cite here data on temporary or permanent loss of working capacity on the part of pilots, due to the irregularities of their social and living conditions. But, in the opinion of officials of the Air Force's medical service, the percentage of flight personnel who quit some degree prematurely is high."

Having heard from the dispatcher a report that they did not plan to accept us in the Transbaykal Military District, we decided to find out the reason for the delay. Lt Col V. Avdeyev, an officer from the Unified Air Traffic Control System [YeS UVD], informed us that once Transbaykal learned that the aircraft belonged to the navy they answered: "It is not from our department; we will not accept it." When, 3 hours 32 minutes after landing, Capt Opalev again contacted YeS UVD, they answered: "Moscow is working on you. There will be an instruction from there and we will "push through" your request farther..."

The facts indicate that the air traffic control system is increasingly eroded by lack of departmental coordination and dependence on many subjective factors, the farther one gets from Moscow. Thus to the question, "Why is the crew not being received in the Transbaykal Military District?" we were able to obtain this answer from Lt Col Yemelyanov (an officer from YeS UVD who refused to give his first name and patronymic): "We have fuel only for the commander; for you there is none." And only a total of four tons were required to refuel the An-26. After this they forgot entirely about our crew.

Here I would like to raise this question for discussion by YeS UVD specialists. Would not the organization of flight transfers be improved if crew shift changes at YeS UVD command posts were carried out after requests for

the following day had all come in? The arriving YeS UVD shift could carry out preparatory work and it also would implement the request. Now, as the saying goes, one group is involved in theory and another in practice. And if one shift omitted something, the other corrects its mistakes or forgets about it all together.

"I would be glad to be flying, I'm sick of making requests!" joked Capt Opalev grimly as he headed for the mess hall four hours after landing. It was necessary to seek out Maj Yu. Yanovskiy, the OBATO commander, to see that he instructed the mess hall personnel to prepare food, and then to listen for a long time to his complaints all about the same lack of departmental coordination and lack of mutual understanding between commanders of different departments.

This airfield is for the joint basing of Air Defense and Air Force aircraft. All questions pertaining to supporting transiting flight crews are assigned to Air Defense officers. And only bureaucratic confusion about "who is senior here?" can explain the difficulties that both the airfield command and transiting flight crews have to encounter.

We succeeded in obtaining the go ahead to fly to one of the Transbaykal Military District airfields finally owing to personal acquaintanceship. But only 15 minutes before landing was Capt Opalev able to establish radio communications with the airfield command and dispatch post. The flight controller ran up to turn on the radio-technical equipment on a special basis to receive the An-26.

"Maj Vovk, YeS UVD duty officer, only told us about your arrival 20 minutes ago." Warrant Officer S. Shilov, airfield dispatcher, thus explained what had happened.

In order to fly on to the Far Eastern Military District, it was again necessary to resort to the technique that had so justified itself, called "personal acquaintanceship."

The "hospitality" that transiting flight crews encounter in the Far East was discussed in detail in previous correspondence. But, as before, unless the regiment commander is meeting you personally himself, you will not get into the modern, nine-story hotel not far from the airfield. One can only make arrangements to spend the night in the "hut for transiting flight crews," which is located to the side of the district Air Force headquarters. Structures of this type are forever in a state of capital repair. Fresh whitewash is in patterns from cracks and rain water, the rooms are in half darkness, and the so-called conveniences are almost in the street. The duty personnel in such hotels when they meet crews apologize, saying they would like to help, but there is nothing they can do. At the same time, at many airfields next to the runway we saw not huts, but fairy-tale palaces, which were locked awaiting unknown guests.

Capt Opalev's crew considered that this transit flight had gone normally. They had experienced worse, and had packed for about eight days. Nevertheless, I wanted to prevail upon the pilots that this attitude toward them was far from the norms defined in guidance documents. And we attempted to use an example to show this. We phoned from Kamchatka to the VVS duty service and asked them to track the movement of the An-26 on its return trip.

The ground services organizing and monitoring air traffic control also did not have to disrupt anything. Each of the officials responsible for his sector of work this time fulfilled his duties conscientiously, and in one day the crew had covered a distance of five time zones. At an airfield in the Siberian Military District specialists from the dispatch service, led by Warrant Officer T. Bunkova, met us. The drivers of the refueling vehicle and the duty vehicle who were transporting the personnel reported to her that they were ready, and she monitored the readiness of the mess hall workers to feed hot food to the transiting flight crew, strictly watched over the correctness of the request made by Capt Lipatov, the aircraft navigator, for the subsequent flight routes, and immediately transmitted it to the YeS UVD duty officer. Here for the first time the crew encountered a control group that conscientiously fulfilled its duties.

In the morning the well rested crew continued its journey.

It remains for us only to thank the Navy's aviation command for giving us the opportunity to carry out the

flight, and the officers of the Air Force duty service for assistance in organizing and conducting the experiment.

9069

Air Transport Delays: Telegram from Stranded Helicopter

*18010043e Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 Dec 87 p 1*

[Unsigned Article: "We Request Assistance." Passage in italics as published]

[Text] *Moscow. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA editors. Since 12 November our helicopter crew has not been able to fly from Konotop Airport. The air traffic control posts are not assisting us in our transit. We request assistance. Crew commander Kuznetsov.*

From the editors. We received this telegram the evening of 7 December as a response to the article by Col A. Dudin and A. Andryushkov, "Again About the Barriers," published on 26 November of this year. Although more than 10 days have passed since the time of publication, it is apparent that no effective measures have been taken locally to improve the organization and support of transit flights. Otherwise how can one explain that a helicopter crew has had to spend almost a month trying to get permission to fly to the place of its next landing?

9069

U. S. Said to Have Found Stingers on Iranian Vessel
18010048d Moscow LESNAYA PROMYSHLENNOST in Russian 15 Oct 87 p 3

[Article by V. Begishev: "Stingers Obtained"]

[Text] The report was sensational, but very ominous. On one of the Iranian gunboats seized by the Americans in the Persian Gulf were found fuses and packaging for Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. These portable, shoulder-fired missiles find the target themselves from its heat emission and are considered very effective weapons against aviation. Until relatively recently the U. S., where the stinger is produced, considered it permissible to transfer it only to its closest allies, and this was an understandable precaution. It is easy to imagine what a terrorist fanatic might do who acquired a Stinger and decided to go hunting after civilian airliners. And, when the idea arose in Washington to supply the Afghan dushmanis [rebels], and then the Savimba bands in Angola with such missiles, numerous precautionary voices were raised.

Sober-minded people (and not at all necessarily those who are among the advocates of Kabul and Luanda) warned that the dangerous weapon would fall into the hands of those who place little value on human life, but high value on money, and who for a good price would willingly sell the overseas gift to any sufficiently generous purchaser.

But, judging by everything, Iran not only paid well, but also granted the Afghan counterrevolution additional bases on its territory, and the latter in exchange "shared" the new American rockets. Teheran officially confirmed the acquisition of Stingers, but was silent about its source. It was stated that it planned to set up its own production of them. They also boasted that supposedly they had already knocked down an American helicopter over the gulf with such a missile (the Pentagon still denies this, but it may have understandable reasons for its denial).

Now let us think a little about what might come of this new situation. In Iran there quite obviously exist influential circles inclined toward a "war to a victorious end" both against the "Iraqi aggressor," and against those who interfere with its ability to "punish" Iraq. Patient diplomatic efforts and a search for formulas for political normalization that are acceptable to both participants in the conflict, as proposed by the well-known UN Security Council Resolution No 598, could neutralize the extremist frames of mind. Instead of this, the U. S., paying verbal tribute to the role that the international community can play in solving the problem, has virtually embarked upon a path of unilateral actions, with the assistance of a NATO force that it was still trying to drag into this business. The situation resulted in the use of

weapons once, and then again. The threats of Teheran in response were not considered serious. However, in my opinion, the stingers substantially strengthen them.

According to the Western press, Iran possibly received approximately two dozen such missiles. They can hardly help in the battle against the numerous combat aircraft and helicopters that the U. S. has allocated for "protection" of ships. But, for "punitive strikes," and for the organization of terrorist acts that would have a painful response on American public opinion, they are entirely suitable. It is hardly worthwhile to idealize those who are imbued with the ideas of "Islamic resolution." Those who send children into minefields, I submit, will not stop to think about also sending terrorists with Stingers to places where busy civilian flight routes run. It is frightening to think about this.

This is to what the logic of "neo-globalism," which strives to turn regional conflicts to its benefit, leads. The policy that Washington is carrying out currently in the Persian Gulf region is clearly dictated by this. On the one hand are concocted arguments concerning the need "to not allow the Soviet Union to fill a vacuum." On the other, it seems to me, is an attempt to "score points" in the eyes of Iraq, which is interested in obtaining the quickest possible end to the war. The U. S. is clearly attempting to present itself now as a *de facto* ally of Baghdad, and pays no attention to the fact that Iraqi aviation is also attacking third country ships on the approaches to Iranian oil terminals. And Washington, no doubt, learned not without satisfaction of the statements of some Iraqi newspapers, which hinted at the "extreme inertness" of a certain neighboring great power, supposedly ready to satisfy Iran "out of political considerations."

However, the situation in the Persian Gulf is too serious for self-interested games. Here a high degree of responsibility is required.

9069

U.S. Said to Use 'Soviet Threat' to Justify Pacific Expansion
18010030d Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Oct 87 p 5

[Article by D. Belskiy: "The Rash of Bases: What Are the Authors of Washington's Latest Propaganda Deals Trying to Justify?"]

[Text] The militarization of the Asian-Pacific Ocean region is rapidly gaining speed. It is motivated by Washington's neoglobal ambitions. The Pentagon is attempting to create a second line of military confrontation in the Pacific in addition to the one in Europe. This is borne out, among other things, by the propaganda pamphlet *U.S. Military Positions in the Pacific Ocean* put out by the USIA. It states that the zone of the U.S. command in the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, with

headquarters on the Hawaiian Islands, includes the territory from the Pacific coast of North and South America to the eastern coast of Africa and from the Arctic to the Antarctic. Around 250 combat ships have been deployed there, including the latest nuclear-powered submarines carrying Trident missiles, battleships with Tomahawk cruise missiles and nuclear-powered cruisers, as well as more than 2,000 combat aircraft, including B-52 strategic bombers.

Even this massive military presence in the area is not enough for Washington to implement its policy of neoglobalism, however. Amplifying the myth of a "Soviet military threat" and justifying itself by claiming that it has to defend U.S. "vital interests," to which many pages in the aforementioned pamphlet are devoted, the Pentagon continues to build up the Pacific grouping of U.S. armed forces.

Particular attention is being given to Japan, where 120 American bases and military installations are located. The largest of these are the naval bases at Yokosuka and Sasebo, which have become permanent bases for surface ships and submarines of the 7th Fleet, including those carrying nuclear weapons. The role of the Japanese islands in U.S. strategy was increased markedly with the deployment at Misawa Air Base of American F-16 fighter-bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

U.S. bases in the southern part of the Korean Peninsula constitute an equally serious source of nuclear danger. U.S. forces have 40 large bases and military installations there, located at Seoul, Pusan, Osan, Kunsan, Taegu and Kwangju, in camps along the Demilitarized Zone and in other areas. American troops are armed with nuclear artillery (155mm and 203.2mm howitzers), atomic mines and aircraft which carry nuclear death. Ships of the U.S. 7th Fleet equipped with nuclear weapons regularly call at the South Korean ports of Pusan and Chinhae.

We know that even during the Korean War the highest political and military leaders of the USA considered the possibility of employing weapons of mass destruction against the DPRK and the PRC. Plans for nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula still exist. General E. Meyer, former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, openly stated that "American armed forces in South Korea can use tactical nuclear weapons if necessary." Such intentions are also indicated by the fact that nuclear strikes against the territory of the DPRK have been practiced for more than a single year during large-scale American and South Korean maneuvers.

Washington's strategic plans call not just for retaining the 1,000 nuclear warheads which exist in the southern part of Korea, but also for building up that arsenal. This is why the U.S. is beginning the deployment of Lance operational and tactical missiles in South Korea. The Pentagon pretends that this is just an ordinary step. If we

call a spade a spade, however, the Lance missiles represent the latest attempt by the U.S. to achieve military superiority and are essentially a new factor in the regional military situation. By deploying these missiles the U.S. is essentially introducing new parameters into the strategic situation in the Far East.

American military bases in the Philippines form one of the buttresses of U.S. nuclear "neoglobalism" in Asia. The primary ones are the naval base at Subic Bay and Clark Field Air Base, the largest outside the USA. Around 70 ships and submarines from the 7th Fleet are in the harbor of the naval base at Subic Bay every month. This base has been adapted for servicing nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft-carriers. Enormous stockpiles of fuel and ammunition have been established there. Clark Field, a U.S. Air Force base capable of receiving B-52 strategic bombers, has been turned into an important outpost of the American armed forces. The airfield built there can service 12,000 take-offs and landings a month.

The U.S. regards the islands of Micronesia, which occupy an important strategic position, as a sort of rear area. New links have appeared in the chain of bases built there by Washington. Stockpiles of nuclear and chemical weapons and bases for training the Green Berets have been established on the island of Babelthuap. Stockpiles of ammunition and communication stations have also been set up on the Marshall Islands. The construction of bases for the Navy and Air Force is underway on the islands of Tinian and Saipan. Facilities which are a part of the "Star Wars" program are being built on Kwajalein.

The U.S. is building up its presence also in the northern Pacific. At the end of last year the U.S. Air Force decided to build a large air and naval base on the island of Adak (Aleutian Islands).

The U.S. uses military bases on Australian territory in its nuclear strategy. American B-52 strategic bombers, which carry every possible sort of ammunition, including nuclear ammunition, enjoy the right to land at Australian airfields in the northern part of the country on flights from a base on the island of Guam to the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.

The U.S. rents the territory containing the Pine Gap base in the center of Australia. The Pentagon has set up a technical military station there, which effects communications through a system of artificial satellites between American submarines and surface ships in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the command center, and collects information gathered and transmitted by spy satellites.

Today, there is talk about granting the U.S. armed forces new bases in the central and southern part of the state of New South Wales, near the cities of Orange and Bathurst. The Australians link preparations for the

establishment of new American bases to the possibility that the United States will lose the bases it rents in the Philippines. Plans are simultaneously being worked out for transferring the American naval base at Christchurch, New Zealand, to the Australian port of Hobart. This move is a result of the law passed by New Zealand's Parliament banning calls at the nation's ports by American ships carrying nuclear weapons.

Washington's neoglobalist policy, which is resulting in an increased American military presence in the region, is increasing the danger of confrontation and causing tensions to rise in Asia and the Pacific. This is why the peoples who live there are more and more actively supporting Soviet proposals aimed at lowering the level of military confrontation and strengthening security and stability in that region of the planet.

11499

Anti-ship Mines of Western Navies Reviewed
18010035b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Nov 87 p 3

[Article by Capt 3d Rank A. Kolpakov, candidate of military sciences, under the rubric "Military Technical Review": "Sea Mines"]

[Text] The history of mine weapons knows quite a few periods when interest in something is lost and then is renewed once more. Lately, foreign military experts agree that the mine weapon is one of the principal naval means employed in armed conflict and that, using the criterion "effectiveness-cost-benefit," it lays claim to one of the first places among conventional types of naval weapons. It is believed that mining on large scales for offensive and defensive purposes to resolve tactical, operational, and strategic tasks will receive wide application.

Referring to NATO specialists, the foreign press sets forth views on the diversity of uses of sea mines: to blockade basing areas of enemy naval forces, straits, narrows, inland waterways, and distant regions in naval theaters so as not to allow the operational deployment of hostile strike forces; to destroy enemy submarine and surface ship strike force groupings on movement routes and in areas of combat operations, impeding penetration through straits zones; to disrupt ocean, sea and river transport and to defend friendly naval bases, ports and sea routes; and to establish antilanding defenses on islands and sectors of friendly seacoasts.

Among the important merits ascribed to the mine weapon, as the journal SEA TECHNOLOGY notes, are its ability to be employed surreptitiously irrespective of the state of the sea (ice situation and hydrometeorological conditions, etc.); a capability for bringing prolonged and uninterrupted pressure on the enemy, and the ability to withstand obsolescence and ageing. The mine weapon

diverts substantial enemy forces and means, and it is distinguished by surprise and effective action against a target, with automatic assurance of selectivity, etc.

Proceeding from this, the naval forces of the NATO countries, the foreign press reports, are conducting work on a broad front to create new models of mines and are investigating appropriate tactical techniques for their combat use. A special scientific research center is conducting the coordination of scientific research work on mine weapons within the framework of the NATO bloc.

Mines are presently being developed for laying at medium and intermediate depths (400-1,000 meters)—antisubmarine mines with large zones of destruction, mines against ships with dynamic principles of support, and mines for laying by helicopters. Such mines, as a rule, are equipped with combined influence firing mechanisms and logic computing devices that make it possible to distinguish a target from a simulator lure and minelaying systems.

Modern materials and explosives enable making mines with great power in small sizes and to camouflage them from optical, magnetic and acoustic detection systems. Three principal programs of the U.S. Navy—"Captor," "MDM" and "Quick Strike"—are directed at accomplishing these tasks, notes the foreign press.

The "Captor" program envisions the development of an antisubmarine, multipurpose deep-water moored torpedo mine. Mk-60 is the designation assigned to it. The design of the mine includes a cylindrical container and an anchor device which permits setting it up at depths of up to 800 meters. The airtight container has a reduced size antisubmarine Mk-46 torpedo (maximum speed of 45 knots, operational range up to 11 km, operational depth up to 450 meters, homing system operational range of about 1,000 meters), and an electronic device for detecting a target and producing the torpedo launch command.

According to foreign press data, more than \$100 million was spent on the development of the Mk-60 "Captor" mine, and the cost of one mine is approximately \$290,000. It is planned to have 5,785 mines by the end of the 1980's.

The "MDM" program is directed at the creation of a reactive surfacing broadband mine for destroying surface ships and submarines at medium depths. Foreign specialists consider that this mine will be employed at depths of from 60 to 300 meters. It is an elongated mine that resembles a torpedo cylinder, and it is equipped with a rocket motor, an explosive charge and a ship and submarine passive detection system. The mooring device holds the mine in a vertical position at installation, and the detection system issues commands for rocket motor ignition and separation from the mooring. The mines can be laid by submarines, ships and aircraft.

The "Quick Strike" program provides for the creation of the AMWS unified aviation ready inventory and SLMM self-transportable mines. The "Quick Strike" Mk-62, Mk-64 and Mk-65 bottom mines were developed on the basis of the Mk-82 and Mk-84 aerial bombs and also the 2000-pound module bomb. They are intended for the destruction of surface ships and submarines at depths of up to 100 meters. In the opinion of American specialists, such mines are capable of seriously damaging submarines with titanic hulls. The mine has a magneto-acoustic or hydrodynamic firing device and a remote control system.

A self-transporting mine for surreptitious mining of shallow regions of the sea to protect roads, fairways and harbors was developed on the basis of the Mk-37 torpedo. The mine is equipped with a combined influence firing mechanism. The U.S. Navy intends to acquire 1,200 such mines by the end of the 1980's.

FRG designers are developing a new sea mine in the "Bottom Mine-80" program, within whose scope the DM-51 antilanding mine and the two bottom mines SGM-80 and G-1 are being created. Danish firms are also participating in the development of mine weapons. Their attention is centered on acoustic-induction-hydrodynamic mine-firing devices and microcomputer and logic circuits for classifying and determining coordinates and target movement elements.

Nor does Italy lag behind its NATO partners. The firms "Valtek" and "Misar" are carrying out the development and production of the VSSM600 bottom mine, the MR-80, and the "Manta." Specialists of the naval forces of Italy are showing an interest in broadband deep-water mines of the MAF_o 1 and MAF_o 2 type with deep laying down to 6,000 meters. It is contemplated using 340 and 533 caliber or 900 mm torpedoes as warheads with an operational range up to 5,000 meters, or a rocket which, along with an underwater trajectory, has two above-water trajectories of 1,500- and 4,000 meters.

The mine has four microprocessors which provide target classification and a remote control apparatus. Minelaying can be accomplished by submarines, surface ships and aircraft in sea areas with depths of from 10 to 300 meters. A fiberglass hull of a cylindrical shape ensures a reduced magnetometric and acoustic mine signature and high anticorrosion resistance. It is reported that the storage period of the mine is 30 years. The two bottom mines "Stonefish" and "Sea Urchin," which are earmarked for the destruction of surface ships and submarines, are operational in the navy of Great Britain. The general purpose carrier mines have a modular construction and a combined acoustic-magnetic-hydrodynamic mine-firing mechanism and enhanced anti-minesweeping resistance. The sensitivity and selectivity of each channel of the mine influence exploder are regulated and set before the minelaying with the help of special switches.

The MCT-15 and the MCC 23C mines were adopted by the French navy. The first is intended for the destruction of enemy surface ships and submarines and is placed in coastal shallow water areas with ships of all classes and vessels equipped with mine ramps and tracks. The mines are equipped with combined influence firing mechanisms that react to acoustic and magnetic fields of a target ship. The second—the MCC 23C—is laid through submarine torpedo apparatuses, and also by surface ships and aircraft. It is earmarked for the destruction of submarines and surface ships. It has a cylindrical shape and is equipped with an acoustic-induction influence mine exploder with regulated sensitivity.

Command authorities of the U.S. Navy and NATO are allocating substantial resources to the development of mine weapon delivery systems. The B-52D strategic bomber and the C-130, C-141 and C-5A transport aircraft are used for this purpose. In the event of an emergency situation, the command authorities of the NATO bloc plan to reequip motor vehicle and rail ferries as minelayers, and also the "Ro-Ro" class of vessels. Judging by material in the foreign press, it is planned in the future to develop special modules for minelaying that could be used to equip any ship and vessel.

These are some of the trends in the development of the mine weapon in the navies of the NATO countries.

13052

Use of FRG Naval Forces In Persian Gulf Examined

18010035a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Nov 87 p 3

[Article by Capt M. Zheglov under the rubric "International Notes": "Looking for a Loophole"]

[Text] Not long ago a detachment of West German ships consisting of the destroyer "Melders," the frigate "Niedersachsen" and the auxiliary ship "Freiburg" set a course for the Mediterranean Sea. According to a report of the spokesman for the command element of the combined naval forces of NATO in southern Europe, these ships are currently participating in "Deterrent Force" exercises of the North Atlantic bloc and will remain in that region to the middle of December after completion of the exercises.

The participation of the Bundeswehr in NATO maneuvers is a common occurrence. However, in this case the question concerns the kind of move of the military-political leadership of the FRG that is fraught with the most serious international consequences, inasmuch as it has a direct bearing on the explosive situation in the Persian Gulf.

As is known, the question about the possible direction of the navy ships in the immediate area of the gulf was raised more than once in negotiations and consultations

between high-ranking representatives of the West German government and the American administration. Pressure on official Bonn in this connection was also brought by ruling circles in Great Britain. For example, English Prime Minister Thatcher declared in an interview with the journal SPIEGEL that she expects "sound reflection" from West Germany with regard to the latter's participation in the combined operations of the NATO allies in the Persian Gulf. Washington and London have found themselves a reliable ally on this question inside the ruling coalition in the FRG—Strauss' Christian Social Union (CSU) party. As CSU foreign policy expert Lovak declared, the Federal Republic must be ready "to fulfill unpleasant tasks as well." Interpreting his own statement, he openly announced that the FRG, so he says, must not stand aside from events in the Persian Gulf region.

Meanwhile, the country's constitution prohibits the use of West German armed forces beyond the boundaries of NATO's area of responsibility. Therefore, the dispatch of a unit of naval forces to the Persian Gulf region was not only a direct challenge to a majority of the people of FRG who support a resolution of the conflict in the region through political avenues, but it would also be a direct violation of the country's basic law.

It is not accidental, apparently, that a discussion is in full swing on the pages of the journal EUROPÄISCHE VERKUNDE which is closely connected to FRG military circles, about whether or not to send ships to the Persian Gulf, and an article has appeared on this subject. The article said that ostensibly there are no indications in the basic law as to where specifically West German armed forces can conduct combat operations in the "security interests" of the country. Moreover, the idea is being persistently pushed here that the threat to the FRG is "no longer limited to Europe, but that it now has a global character, and that in this respect it is necessary to defend the interests of the country beyond the boundaries of the NATO sphere." A similar opinion, as it turned out, is now also held by the adviser to the chancellor of the FRG for foreign political affairs Telchik. In an interview for the weekly WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE he said plainly that circles of experts have long held a view regarding the interpretation of the basic law that ostensibly offers more opportunities for the wide employment of West German armed forces, which they are trying to conceive at the present time.

This tendentious, casuistic approach to the interpretation of the constitution, without doubt, is called on to cancel the principle inherent in it of limited employment of FRG armed forces in a geographic sense and to make it possible for them to participate jointly with forces of the United States in any risky actions.

Levadov Commentary on NATO's Autumn

Forge-87

18010040a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Nov 87 p 3

[Article by Col L. Levadov under the rubric "In the Headquarters and Armies of NATO": "Yet Another Rehearsal"]

[Text] The thirteenth and latest annual Autumn Forge-87 NATO fall maneuvers have been completed. The last "i" was dotted on November 10, when the strategic headquarters-command exercises of the combined NATO armed forces in Europe under the name of Able Archer were concluded. At these exercises, according to the Norwegian newspaper AFTENPOSTEN, Atlantic politicians were basking over the maps of Europe along with the generals. Leading state and political figures of all the bloc countries took their places in anti-nuclear bunkers in accordance with the order of battle. It was namely here that the "limited war" in Europe scenario was being played out and, depending on the game situation, "various crucial military and political decisions were made."

Naturally, the representatives of the mass media did not have access to these functions. They are more willingly invited to the troop exercises, where it is easier to conceal the real intent of troop actions and where the attention of the correspondents invited can be concentrated on "entertainment" events: airborne parachute assaults, tank attacks and river crossings. It was namely these issues that were at the center of attention of the Western press, which reported on the fall maneuvers of NATO quite widely, each time emphasizing their "defensive" nature.

The true goals of the NATO players were nonetheless distinctly manifested in the course of the noisy propaganda campaign around the maneuvers: in them, the headquarters and troops of the bloc worked out questions of strategic deployment and individual fragments of the waging of the first operations of the initial period of a conventional war. In the first half of September, particular attention was thus devoted to redeploying the armed forces of the bloc from peacetime to military positions and strengthening the European groupings of NATO through the redeployment of American troops from the United States.

The principal operational measures during this period were the Reforger-87 exercises of the armed forces of the United States, during the course of which some 35,000 servicemen of the 3rd Army Corps were redeployed onto the territory of West Germany. The main body of the personnel of three divisions (the 1st Cavalry, 2nd Armored and 4th Mechanized) used an airlift for this purpose, carried out over several days by the U.S. Military Airlift Command. Upon arrival at airbases in Belgium, Holland and West Germany, the American servicemen were trucked to stores depots located nearby

for weapons and combat equipment and then were dispatched in full combat gear to assigned positions at the West German borders with East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Some of the personnel and equipment was brought over by sea as well.

The second half of September, according to the plan for the Autumn Forge-87 maneuvers, was devoted to working through questions of the waging of combat operations using only conventional weapons. It was during this time that the NATO military machinery reached its maximum speed. The unity of intent of all the NATO exercises in Central Europe revealed itself. According to the overall scenario, troops operated in the Certain Strike exercises of the Northern Army Group, the Kekker Spatz French and West German exercises, the Goldener Leve exercises of the West German 5th Tank Division and the Krevker exercises of the French 3rd Army Corps. Some 14 divisions and 4 brigades with over 200,000 servicemen of the bloc countries took part in the enumerated functions in all, according to official data. That is the kind of games the Atlantic bloc members are playing.

Many of the reports of the Western press were reminiscent of reports from the front in those days: "Red" tanks penetrated into Bavaria through Austria... The enemy breached the 'blue' defense around Hannover... 'Orange' vessels struck at the naval bases and ports of northern Norway."

It was the "reds" that started things according to the NATO scenario once again. Their tank divisions "traversed" the border through mountain passes, along valleys and on roads and in one or two days, having overcome the screening zone in the border belt, had reached the forward defensive positions of the "blues." True, not without exceptional occurrences. When it became known that according to the design of the Kekker Spatz the enemy struck at West Germany across Austrian territory, the Austrian authorities, offended by the indirect accusation of their inability to defend their own territory, lodged a protest with the West German government.

The further development of the scenario also proceeded according to stereotype: the "blues," having stopped the enemy at the forward defensive line, went over to a counteroffensive after regrouping and smashed the troops that had driven in the wedge.

It is completely obvious that in constantly emphasizing the defensive nature of their military doctrine, the Atlantic leaders can only recommend such a scenario to their generals for gaming. It is no secret, however, that offensive missions can also be successfully accomplished under such "defensive" designs. One should simply not forget that in reality the role of the "reds" in bloc exercises is played by their own troops who, operating according to their own precepts, are successfully learning

how to penetrate defenses, develop success in operational depth and carry out raids in the enemy's rear. And those who act as the "blues" also carry out offensive missions as a large part of their exercise time under the guise of delivering counterattacks, counterstrikes and going over to the offensive.

The predominance of offensive operations is the chief distinguishing feature of this year's NATO fall maneuvers. Most instructive in this regard were the exercises of the Turkish Mehmetcik 3rd Field Army. The formations of this army deployed along the border with the USSR worked through no more or less than a "pre-emptive strike against an enemy preparing for an offensive."

The infamous concept of the "battle with second echelons (reserves)" that the NATO strategists put into practice universally in operational planning and combat training of the armed forces of the bloc countries cannot fail to have an effect on the nature of the missions executed by the participants in the exercises. Being passed off as the latest word in military science, this concept assumes the infliction of simultaneous fire on an opposing group of enemy troops to depths of up to 800 kilometers. It is felt, moreover, that the paramount targets of massive air and artillery strikes and the operations of paratroopers and reconnaissance and sabotage groups should be the second echelons and reserves of the opposing divisions, armies and fronts along with aircraft at airfields, anti-aircraft targets, troop command posts, stores and most important communications centers. According to data that have appeared in the Western press, about 2,700 various targets have already been designated for such strikes on the territory of the Warsaw Pact countries. This perhaps testifies most convincingly of all the aggressive and offensive thrust of the bloc's military preparations. After all, even at NATO headquarters they do not conceal the fact that that the planned strike will achieve its aims only in the event that it is a surprise one, that is, with the unleashing of aggression against the countries of the socialist community.

One important specific feature of Autumn Forge-87 is conducting the exercises with a regard for the provisions of the Stockholm Conference Document on Steps to Reinforce Trust, Security and Disarmament in Europe that went into force at the beginning of this year. This year it is necessary to announce 42 days in advance troop movements and exercises with 13,000 or more participants. If the number of participants in these measures reaches 17,000, moreover, observers must be invited. Observers from the states participating in the Conference on Security and Collaboration in Europe [CSCE] have been present at a total of nine NATO exercises this fall.

As testified to by the Western press attending the NATO exercises, the observers expressed satisfaction overall with the incarnation of one of the most important provisions of the Stockholm agreements. It was stressed

at the same time that the conditions envisaged by the Stockholm document for observation were not always created for them. Sometimes, instead of the operations of major troop formations, they were shown the actions of small subunits that were not even associated with the overall intent of the exercises. The stipulated contacts with its participants were not always provided. And after all, the goal of inviting observers to such functions is unambiguous—to show that the military activity being conducted is not of a threatening nature.

In August of 1987 the United States, followed by Great Britain in September, took advantage of the right to inspect the military activity of other states for the first time. The foreign mass media note that the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, on whose territory the inspections were conducted, created all of the essential conditions for the work of the American and British inspection groups. This was also noted in their reports, by the way, which in accordance with the provisions of the Stockholm Document were sent to all of the participating CSCE states. The conclusions drawn as a result of the work of the American and British inspectors were synonymous—the number of troops taking part in the exercises being inspected corresponded precisely to the data that were indicated in the advance announcements on the projected military activity.

The world community is in favor of strict observance of the Stockholm agreements that are leading to a decline in military tensions in Europe. At the same time, it cannot fail to take notice of the fact that a further increase in the scope and intensity of the operational and combat preparations of the NATO armed forces is occurring. That over the course of a multitude of exercises and maneuvers, the strengthened training of bloc troops for decisive offensive operations against the armies of the Warsaw Pact nations is underway. And however much the Atlantic bloc tries to justify and embellish its military activity, it will not be able to confuse the people. The aggressive aims of the North Atlantic bloc presents a serious danger to the cause of peace on earth.

12821

Spanish Bases in Light of INF Treaty
18010040b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Nov 87 p 3

[Article by Ye. Yevgenyev under the rubric "Military and Political Commentary": "Aiming from Afar"]

[Text] The government of Spain has officially informed the United States administration of its decision not to extend the currently operative agreement on friendship, defense, and collaboration, the effective period of which expires on 14 May 88. With this step, Madrid has confirmed the failure of the Spanish-American negotiations that have been going on for over a year and a half on reducing the U.S. military presence in Spain. The negotiations reached a dead end due to the obstructionist

position of Washington. The American side refused to carry out a key requirement of the Spanish government—to remove the F-16 fighter-bombers from the U.S. Air Force base at Torrejon de Ardoz and to close the U.S. Air Force base in Zaragoza.

Spain is continuing to insist on these requirements and intends to achieve their satisfaction in the course of the upcoming negotiations to devise a new bilateral agreement. It has been announced in the Spanish capital that these negotiations will begin in November of this year in Madrid. According to the acknowledgment of the head of the Spanish government, F. Gonzalez, increased pressure on official Madrid so as to incline it toward changing its position on the issue of the bases is expected in the time remaining before the negotiations.

What is the reason for such stubbornness on the part of the United States? Why does the Pentagon impart such great significance to the military bases in Torrejon de Ardoz and Zaragoza?

The fact is, the American military clique puts great store by these bases. They were created in accordance with the Spanish-American treaty of 1953, with the aid of which the Spanish dictator F. Franco tried, with the assistance of the United States, to impart to his regime at least the appearance of respectability. The 401st Tactical Wing of the American Air Force with 72 F-16 fighter-bombers is deployed at the U.S. Air Force base in Torrejon de Ardoz, which has the longest runway in Europe. The Madrid magazine *Tiempo*, referring to information it had obtained, asserted that the aircraft of this wing periodically make flights across the borders of the USSR with nuclear weapons on board, loaded onto them at the American bases of Incirlik in Turkey and Aviano in Italy.

The U.S. Air Force base in Zaragoza plays a no less important role in the strategic machinations and actions of the Pentagon. The American KC-135 and KC-10 tankers stationed there are intended, in the opinion of military specialists, to provide for non-stop flights by U.S. Air Force aircraft in the eastern Mediterranean region. They carried out, in particular, the aerial refueling of the American F-111 fighter-bombers that took part in the raid on the Libyan cities of Tripoli and Benghazi in 1986.

Today, in a climate of the Soviet-American agreement on the elimination of medium- and short-range missiles that is being prepared, militarist circles in the West are engaged in a search for a new strategy and the preparation of an extensive new plan that consists of raising the role of U.S. military bases in Western Europe, including in Spain. In NATO it is felt, as the British newspaper *OBSERVER* wrote, that the Pentagon can make use of its military airbases for the deployment of 336 F-111 fighter-bombers.

It was also reported in the press that after the possible withdrawal of American cruise missiles and Pershing-2 missiles from Western Europe, the Pentagon intends to "lend" the Western Europeans B-52 bombers with cruise missiles. The longest runway in Europe at the Torrejon de Ardoz airbase would also be most suitable for that.

The attempts of the U.S. strategists to preserve Air Force bases in Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Turkey no matter what, as well as in other countries, by the way, that Washington feels are strategically important to it from the point of view of implementing its neoglobalist policies, become comprehensible in light of such machinations.

The purely political aspect of this issue is also exceedingly material for the American administration. Under conditions where the protests of the Western Europeans against the presence of American bases in their countries are becoming more extensive, Washington is afraid that the loss of the bases in Spain will entail a sort of chain reaction whose losses are difficult even to imagine.

12821

Objection to U.S. Study of Swedish Anti-Submarine Defense

18010040c Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Nov 87 p 3

[Article by O. Vakulovskiy under the rubric "International Notes": "Transoceanic 'Sonar'"]

[Text] It has long been noted that as soon as the latest campaign in connection with "foreign submarines in Swedish territorial waters" abates in Sweden, an unhealthy activeness is observed on the part of the military circles of the United States and NATO on this issue. The Swedes need only weaken and forget a little this mythical "underwater threat," and they are immediately reminded of its existence. The impression is thereby being created that the transoceanic sonar is so much more sensitive than the Swedish that it is able to pick up any suspicious movements in the territorial waters of this long-neutral country right from the Pentagon.

Some American researcher named Leitenberg, who published his paper in Washington, recently came forward in the role of this "sonar." "The Swedish Coastal Defenses are not Working!" was the title and main topic of this new American opus. Its author clearly is not lacking in expressions. "Sweden," he asserts, "has many times in practice not fulfilled its publicly proclaimed principles according to which foreign submarines are a test for Sweden of its ability and desire to take care of its neutrality."

For Leitenberg, it is not only perfectly clear whose submarines are "carousing" off the Swedish coast. He gladly shares his "knowledge" with the Scandinavians, proving with an important air that the USSR is conducting "broad-scale submarine operations" off the coast of Sweden.

This persistence is no accident. It has been emphasized several times in reports of the commander in chief of the armed forces of Sweden on violations of the territorial borders of the country that the navy cannot confirm anything concrete on the national affiliation of foreign intruder submarines. These declarations clearly in no way disabuse the "foreign observers" striving to inculcate in the Swedes the idea that the submarines could only be Soviet. Their agitation is understandable: the "antisubmarine campaign" has not confined itself to the accustomed anti-Soviet channels in recent years. And the Atlantic strategists can in no way permit this.

They are even ready to proceed to intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. That is in essence what Leitenberg is doing in accusing Sweden of "a lack of determination." He declares therein that "the political leadership of Sweden is terribly afraid that the consequences of dropping depth charges will be that they will have dozens of dead Soviet sailors on their hands."

In frightening the Swedish leaders with such a gloomy prospect, Leitenberg has completely forgotten that the Swedish Navy has already employed depth charges against "foreign submarines" without success. Such forgetfulness by the American researcher is understandable, however. His task consists of declaring to the Swedes without a shadow of a doubt that "the Russians are underwater!"

But even Leitenberg was unable to do this without any doubt. He asserts that "there remains something mysterious in the submarine operations that has not yet found a sensible answer." It is essential to note in this regard that there is a very simple method that would make it possible to be rid of any excessive mystery. It is only necessary to pose a series of specific questions: to whose advantage is a campaign about "Soviet submarines in Swedish waters" that is clearly aimed at undermining the good-neighbor relations between the USSR and Sweden? Who has a vested interest in creating a "Russian underwater threat" with the aid of which they are trying so stubbornly to drag Sweden into the North Atlantic alliance? It seems that one can manage to find direct and clear answers to them without super-sensitive transoceanic sounders.

12821

Critique of Japanese Book on 'Defense of Straits'

18010048b Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
30 Nov 87 p 1

[Article by S. Agafonov: "In the Spirit of a Policy of Strength." Passage in italics as published]

[Text] Tokyo. (*Izvestiya Correspondent*). A few days ago a large reception was held, organized on the occasion of the publication of the book, "Defense of the Straits," published by the Japanese Center for Strategic Studies under the editorship of S. Kanemaru, former deputy Japanese prime minister, ruling party veteran, and spiritual father of current premier.

This publication was announced by the press here as a very important report by a scientific research group. What is the book about? If one were to summarize the views expressed therein, they amount to the following:

- A blockade of the three far eastern straits by Japanese "self-defense forces" in the case of emergencies is the heart of the defense of all of Japan;
- the blockade of the straits must be oriented on "blocking" the Soviet Pacific Fleet in the Sea of Japan and untying the hands of the American Fleet for actions in the Pacific and Indian oceans;
- in blockading the straits the danger exists of a Soviet invasion of Hokkaido Island, which requires that Japan qualitatively improve its defense capability and build up its weapons;
- the Japanese Government must intensify its work in the field of security problems and prepare legislation in case of rapid mobilization under "emergency conditions," as well as create a national intelligence center for the collection of strategic information;
- the document recognizing the need to establish a tripartite organ among Japan, the U. S. and South Korea to coordinate military operations.

This list of tasks is already rather eloquent. Essentially it is a program of action, to the realization of which are directed the efforts of ruling conservative Japanese circles who favor turning Japan into a mighty military power, and revising the legislative provisions holding back the growth of militarism. At the same time, this program is an echo of American strategic concepts of war in the Pacific Ocean.

Had "Defense of the Straits" come from the pen of one of the numerous political scientists of right wing inclination practicing in the field of militaristic propaganda, it would not even have been worth mentioning. The book, however, was written by serious people who enjoy considerable influence in Japanese political circles. It is enough to say that the core of the Center for Strategic Studies consists not only of former employees of the National Defense Directorate, but also of deputies to the Japanese parliament, the majority of whom are in the grouping of N. Takeshita, the current prime minister.

Recalling this fact, the Japanese mass media poses numerous alarming questions about the future of the country. It seems that there is every reason for such concern.

9069

Antonov Notes Continued Threat From NATO After INF

*18010048c Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
4 Dec 87 p 1*

[Article by V. Antonov: "NATO Military Leaders Meet." Passage in italics as published]

[Text] Brussels. (*Izvestiya Correspondent*). For a three day period the leading military organs of NATO — the Eurogroup, the Military Committee, and the Military Planning Committee — met in Ever, a suburb of the Belgian capital, where NATO Headquarters is located.

Local observers indicate that preparations for the Soviet-American summit meeting undoubtedly left an imprint on the course of the meetings in Ever. Thus, the final communique at the end of the Military Planning Committee session emphasized that its participants expressed complete support for the forthcoming agreement between the USSR and the U. S. on the elimination of intermediate and shorter range missiles, and favored its most prompt ratification. The communique also notes that a new high-level Soviet-American meeting must help establish more constructive relations between East and West.

At the same time, the summary documents from the sessions of the higher NATO military leadership vividly indicate that at the center of their attention were questions associated with a further buildup of militaristic preparations, implementation of a coordinated NATO "nuclear deterrence strategy" and with qualitative strengthening of the arsenals of "classic types of weapons" based on the latest technological achievements.

9069

Pentagon Delays Production of Stealth Bomber 18010089 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Jan 88 p 4

[Unattributed 100-word article entitled: "Foreign Military News: Delayed..."]

[Text] The Pentagon has delayed by one year the entry into service of the super secret Stealth bomber, the development of which is being conducted by one of the largest Pentagon contractors - the Northrup Corporation. The CBS television company reported this. "Technical and production problems" were cited as the reasons for this necessary step.

The development of the newest strategic bombers, designed with the use of Stealth technology, which makes them practically invisible on the screens of radar systems, — is one of the main elements of the massive program "the rearming of America" instituted soon after the current administration came to power. According to the Pentagon's plans, they must be ready for deployment

by the beginning of the 1990's. The cost of development and production of each of these strategic bombers has already been estimated at 300 million dollars. In all, it is planned to build 132 Stealth bombers.

UD/335

Soviet General's View of Afghanistan Situation
18120032 Moscow APN MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 22, Nov 87 pp 2-3

[Article by Maj Gen Viktor Barynkin: The Command of a Soviet Limited Troop Contingent in Afghanistan Does Not Want To Solve the Conflict by Force of Arms"]

[Text] The Province of Parwan where I serve cannot yet be called a quiet place. All in all, up to 370 mujaheddin units are operating here. With 20 of them the lawful government has signed agreements on the maintenance of common security and non-resumption of hostilities, by which it strictly abides.

As a rule, armed formations from the local population do not violate agreements, either. Why? As I see it, the army leaders of local bands see for themselves that Soviet army servicemen do nothing bad to their relatives, even if they know for certain who of the family members are fighting on the side of the armed opposition. They also see that their families are not denied medical aid, or assistance in repairing irrigation facilities.

The hostilities in the province are conducted by units smuggled from other parts of the country, or Pakistan. They are especially cruel to the population, and resort to sophisticated provocations. Their favourite method is to launch attacks from those regions whose seniors have

signed truce agreements, in the hope to provoke retaliation against local villages. What do we do in such situations? In any event, we do no harm to civilians, and try to avoid destruction and spare the crops.

We have to retaliate in the event of direct attacks on Soviet soldiers, subversion at communications, or in escorting columns with foods and fuels if they are attacked by mujaheddins. In exceptional cases we help Afghan army units to eliminate the biggest bands.

I have often talked with Afghans, mostly with peasants. Opinions are also exchanged on the terms which are necessary for the return home of the Soviet contingent. The conclusion may seem paradoxical at first sight: the population is not so much interested in our early departure, although they recognize the need for it, as they are concerned over their own safety in this case. Self-defense peasant forces in villages are too small to protect their population against big bands which are being smuggled into the country. The presence of Soviet army servicemen as such does not allow bands to pass all bounds.

I fully agree with the majority of those Afghans whom I've met personally: if the United States and Pakistan did not interfere in Afghan affairs, the so-called "civil-war" would be over in a couple of months. Then the reasons for our stay in Afghanistan would cease to exist.

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